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It is broadly accepted in the scholarly community that nationalism is dependent on the telling 
and retelling of national stories about the past. What these stories say is never a complete, 
historically accurate summary of past events. It is limited to those events, individuals, 
interpretations, and values considered of importance to the “nation”. This means that the 
experiences of certain individuals or social groups may be left out. However, in some 
countries, including Russia, Australia, and the European Union, there have been attempts to 
negotiate a more inclusive national narrative. This process has often encountered conflict as 
different actors compete to express their personal identity. In this thesis, I aim to use 
commemorative days as a focus through which to explore this process of national narratives 
negotiation. I will study three separate commemorative events in three geographical regions: 
Victory Day in Russia, Anzac Day in Australia, and the European Day of Remembrance for 
the Victims of Nazism and Stalinism. In doing this, I will view the structural limitations of 
nationalist narratives and explore the nature of the conflicts that arise when different 
interpretations of national identity come into conflict. Overall, I explore the potential of 
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I was born in the mid-1990s, at time when the ethnic tensions and violence in the former 
Yugoslavia brought the study of nationalism back into prominence. Since then, despite 
predictions of its impending decline in the face of globalisation, the resurgence of nationalism 
has continued. At the end of 2018, the President of the United States of America, Donald 
Trump, openly declared that he was a nationalist and encouraged his followers to embrace the 
term.1 Across Europe, nationalist political parties have continued to gain ground, often 
expressing exclusionary anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic rhetoric in the process. It is often 
claimed that nationalism is also the impetus behind the rise of authoritarian leaders such as 
Vladimir Putin in Russia, Recep Erdogan in Turkey, Narendra Modi in India, and Xi Jinping 
in China. In this context, it seems that the study of nationalism continues to be of importance. 
In 1992, two years before I was born, Liah Greenfeld wrote the book Nationalism: 
Five Roads to Modernity, in which she made the point that ‘Nationalism is not necessarily a 
form of particularism … A nation coextensive with humanity is in no way a contradiction in 
terms’.2 She was arguing that nationalism did not necessarily have to be exclusionary or 
divisive. Furthermore, in Greenfeld’s view, nationalism in the purest sense was 
fundamentally linked to concepts of democracy, and at the core of modern nationalism was a 
compelling, inclusive image of a sovereign community of equal members. This view of 
nationalism may be extremely optimistic, but over the years other academics have made 
similar claims. Hans Kohn, writing in the 1940s, at a time when Nazism and Fascism were 
exploiting nationalism for destructive ends, was keen to show how the idea of nationalism 
 
1 Peter Baker, ‘“Use that Word!”: Trump Embraces the “Nationalist” Label’ The New York Times (Oct. 24, 
2018), A12.  
2 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 7. 
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could be liberal and progressive.3 A similar assertion was made in 1997 by Richard Rorty, 
who claimed that it was essential for the political left to adopt a pragmatic form of patriotism 
in their fight against economic inequality.4 
The ideas expressed by Greenfeld and others raise a question of vital importance to 
those of us living at the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century: can nationalism 
be deployed as a force for good? More specifically, can nationalism be divorced from the 
language of exclusion and ethnic divisions, and be used instead to defend concepts of 
individual civil liberties, inclusivity, and democracy? That is the question that this thesis 
seeks to answer. 
To this end, I will study three separate commemorative events in three geographical 
regions: Victory Day in Russia, Anzac Day in Australia, and the European Day of 
Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and Stalinism in the European Union. The link 
between nationalism and commemorative days is very strong, as commemorative days 
provide an annual opportunity for people to reflect upon key events in national history. When 
people talk, write, or act on these days, they engage with fundamental questions about 
national identity―questions about who we are, and who we are not.  
The thesis consists of four chapters, the first of which summarises the various 
scholarly interpretations and debates about the historical origins and key cultural features of 
nationalism. It also lays out the theoretical concepts that have shaped this thesis and explains 
the selection of case studies. The second chapter discusses Victory Day in Russia, and the 
interplay between the official Red Square Military Parade and the semi-official 
commemoration of the ‘Immortal Regiment’. It explores the expression and suppression of 
individuality in nationalist commemorations. The third chapter examines Anzac Day in 
 
3 Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background, (New York: Macmillan, 1946), 
10. 
4 Richard Rorty, Achieving our Country, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 14-15. 
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Australia and the conflicts that arise between different interpretive communities within a 
civic nationalist context. The inflexible nature of nationalist plot-structures is also explored. 
The fourth chapter discusses the European Union’s attempts to create a supra-national 
narrative about the ‘European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and 
Stalinism’. This in turn leads to a discussion of the difficulties encountered when negotiating 
national narratives. The thesis concludes by drawing all the threads and themes together in 




Chapter 1: Theories of Nationalism and Primary Sources 
 
Nationality is the foremost identity of the modern world. For at least the past 200 years, 
nationalist movements and ideologies have done their best to reshape modern descriptions 
and categories of human identities. In this, they have been remarkably successful. The drive 
to categorise humanity by way of nationality has spread across every continent. It has 
intersected and merged with other ideologies and beliefs such as liberalism, conservatism, 
and communism. Today, every state in the world justifies its existence by referring to the 
right of national self-determination. Equally, separatist movements justify their claim to 
independence on the grounds that they form a distinct national community with its own 
cultural and historical tradition, and therefore have the right to self-determination. Modern 
humans encounter references to nations and national identity in almost all aspects of their 
personal and private lives. Whether during election campaigns, news reports, sporting events, 
tax payments, grant applications, descriptions of cuisines, or family relationships, references 
to national communities are everywhere.5 
However, despite its ubiquity, a comprehensive definition of nationalism continues to 
elude academics. In the most general terms, nationalism can be said to be ‘the belief that a 
group of people share distinctive cultural and historical traditions and have the right to live in 
an independent political space.’6 However, this definition is very broad and not universally 
accepted. There is also little consensus among scholars regarding the answers to some key 
questions about nationalism’s nature. What are its origins? Who or what has shaped the 
expressions of national identity over the years? How does it maintain its temporal continuity 
across time and from one generation to another? What is nationalism’s future trajectory and, 
 
5 Michael Billig, Banal nationalism, (London: Sage publishing, 1995), 6. 
6 Lloyd Kramer, Nationalism in Europe and America: Politics, Cultures, and Identities since 1775, (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 1. 
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in an age of multiculturalism, can it evolve to become more liberal and inclusive? Countless 
authors have written about nationalism, and answers to these questions are many and varied. 
Synthesising the concepts of and ideas about nationalism into one all-encompassing analysis 
is therefore remarkably difficult.  
Sociologist Anthony D. Smith provides a typology to group the key ideas in the 
various theoretical approaches to the study of nationalism. He divides these approaches into 
four categories: primordialists, perenialists, modernists, and ethno-symbolists.7 Smith notes 
the existence of a fifth category—post-modernists—but argues that they do not constitute a 
distinct explanatory group. Instead he states that they argue the modernist case using a 
constructivist, rather than a materialist, approach. As such, they are a sub-group of the 
modernists.8 Smith’s typology is useful but flawed. He does provide useful groupings to 
explore the main ideas and strands of thought in the study of nationalism. However, the 
distinctions between Smith’s categories are not as sharp as his typology might initially 
connote and the divisions between academics from the same school of thought are 
downplayed in this model.9 He also gives too much credit to the primordialists and the 
perenialists, who do not have a significant following among serious academics.10 This is 
problematic because it obfuscates key points for which there is consensus.  
Modernists, ethno-symbolists and post-modernists all agree on the socially 
constructed nature of national identity.11 It is broadly accepted that nationalism is dependent 
on the telling and retelling of national stories about the past. However, these stories are not 
static, but change over time. The meaning of national identity can therefore also change over 
 
7 Anthony D. Smith, ‘The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?’ Millennium – Journal of International 
Studies Vol 20(3) (1999), 353 – 367. 
8 Smith, ‘The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?’, 22. 
9 Duncan Bell, ‘Mythscapes: memory, mythology, and national identity’ British Journal of Sociology Vol 54(1) 
(March 2003), 67. 
10 Ibid., 67. 
11 Ibid., 68. 
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time alongside shifts in the national narrative. National narratives are told largely through 
symbols and public rituals, of which commemorative days are an important example. 
Commemorative days provide an annual opportunity for people to reflect on the identity of 
the collective to which they think they belong.12 Commemorative days are also moments 
when individuals can debate and negotiate their national history and change the meaning of 
their national identity. When these days are uncontentious, concepts of national identity 
simmer quietly in the background. On the other hand, periods of conflict, contestation, or 
transformation often bring discussions about the national narrative to the fore. When people 
talk, argue, write, or protest about commemorative days, they contribute to the construction 
of their collective identity.  
The formation and transformation of national identity on commemorative days is 
directly relevant to questions about the inclusive, liberal potential of nationalism as a whole. 
What is represented on commemorative days is never a complete, historically accurate 
summary of past events. Instead, it is a limited story based on the past which focuses on those 
events, individuals, interpretations, and values considered of importance to the nation. This 
means that the experiences of certain individuals or social groups may be left out. Exactly 
why certain experiences are excluded can differ depending on the context. Regardless, the 
fact that some experiences are prioritized over others demonstrates a certain level of 
inequality between social groups. Indeed, those who are excluded from the national narrative 
often face discrimination in other aspects of their social life. The attempt to create a more 
liberal national identity typically involves attempts to broaden the national story to 
incorporate the experiences of those who were previously excluded. The ability to broaden or 
shape the narrative depends partly on the structures of nationalism, but also on the 
 
12 Karen Gammelgaard and Ljiljana Šarić ‘Discursive construction of national holidays in West and South 
Slavic countries after the fall of communism,’ in Transforming National Holidays, ed. Ljiljana Šarić, Karen 
Gammelgaard, and Kjetil Rå Hauge, (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2012), 6. 
7 
 
involvement of different actors. In the literature on nationalism, scholars have emphasised the 
role in this process of political and social elites, artists, historians, political commentators, 
and everyday people. Different scholars place more or less emphasis on the involvement of 
various social groups. They therefore have different opinions on the potential for nationalism 
to incorporate marginalised people. 
The aim of this thesis is to use commemorative days as a focus through which to view 
the structural limitations of nationalist narratives and the conflicts that arise when different 
interpretations of national identity come into conflict. In doing this, the thesis will engage 
with the question posed in the introduction: can nationalism be divorced from the language of 
exclusion and ethnic divisions and be used instead to defend concepts of individual civil 
liberties and democracy? It is therefore necessary to explore arguments of key theorists in the 
study of nationalism regarding the construction of national narratives. Although the list is by 
no means exhaustive, it covers those theorists who most influenced my thesis. In the 
following chapter, I first explore the key ideas in the study of nationalism by discussing the 
arguments of several key individuals in the modernist, ethno-symbolist, and post-modernist 
schools. I look particularly at their exploration of the key social groups or cultural and 
political conditions that shape the expression of the national narrative and of national identity. 
I also explore the various interpretations of the role of national commemorative days and the 
limitations to the negotiation of national identity. In the second half of this chapter, I discuss 
the methodology and sources used in this thesis. 
 
The Modern Construction of Nations 
Modernists, such as Hans Kohn, Carlton Hayes, Ernest Gellner, Liah Greenfeld, and Eric 
Hobsbawm, emphasise the constructed nature of national identity. They regard the nation and 
the idea of national identity as a product of modernisation. They seek to explain nationalism 
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by focusing on its origins during the political and social revolutions and upheavals of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Modernists therefore see the nation as a recent construct. 
They typically regard nationalism as a political ideology and see references to supposedly 
ancient cultural symbols and traditions as having been invented during the modern era. Much 
of the discourse about the shaping of national identities tends to focus on political and 
intellectual elites. Commemorative days, seen through this lens, are regarded as having been 
constructed to provide legitimacy to the concept of the nation.13  
Many modernists see nationalism’s origins in the ideas of key Enlightenment thinkers. 
Historian Hans Kohn, for instance, notes that the modern concept of the ‘nation’ first arose in 
Europe in response to various intellectual and political crises during the eighteenth century.14 
According to Kohn, the Enlightenment created a great deal of social anxiety by questioning 
the authority of the divinely appointed monarch, and thus threatened the political legitimacy 
of the state. Kohn then argues that Jean Jacques Rousseau found the solution to this social 
and political problem by arguing that free individuals could pledge their allegiance to the 
‘sacred collective personality of the nation’.15 Kohn, along with historian Carlton Hayes, 
argues that the French Revolution (1789-1799) had carried the idea of the ‘nation’ into 
political practice for the first time. The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars spread 
the idea across Europe, and European colonialism then exported nationalism to the rest of the 
world. Both Kohn and Hayes believe that nationalism, at least in its early conception, was 
civic and individualist in form and function.16 They claim that, during the early days of 
modern nationalism, national membership did not require adherence to a specific ethnic 
identity; it was simply a social contract between a free individual and the state to which he or 
she belonged.  
 
13 Kramer, Nationalism in Europe and America, 10 – 16. 
14 Hans Kohn, The idea of Nationalism, 237. 
15 Ibid., 237. 
16 Carlton Hayes, Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, (New York: Richard R. Smith Inc, 1931), 13. 
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Ernest Gellner disagrees with Kohn and Hayes. Gellner sees nationalism as having 
emerged from the institutions of modernity rather than the ideas of specific thinkers. Gellner 
argues that nationalism was an ideological system designed primarily to facilitate the 
development of modern national economies. Modern economies require large numbers of 
people who read the same language, follow the same regulations, and use the same 
technology.17 Nationalism provided the required rationale and institutions for this to occur. 
Gellner does not believe that ‘nationalism imposes homogeneity’, but rather that ‘a 
homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface 
in the form of nationalism’.18 Gellner’s theories influenced many subsequent scholars of 
nationalism, including Liah Greenfeld. She agrees that nationalism was an ideological system 
linked to the development of modern economies. However, she places much greater emphasis 
on the role of individuals. She also argues that ‘the emergence of nationalism predated the 
development of every significant component of modernisation’.19 In other words, nationalism 
was not simply a reaction to modern social and political institutions, but an essential 
precursor to the establishment of these institutions.  
Kohn, Hayes, Gellner, and Greenfeld, agree that nationalism was actively constructed 
as part of a wider process of political, intellectual, and economic development. Nationalism 
provided legitimacy to the massive political, social and economic changes that occurred 
during the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. Appeals to a common national 
culture or history were a useful way to mobilise the population in pursuit of economic or 
political goals. However, the population needed to be taught their national identity before 
they could be mobilised in support of their nation. National identity had to be developed and 
disseminated. One of the ways this was achieved was through national commemorative days. 
 
17 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (New York: Blackwell, 2006), 35. 
18 Ibid., 39. 
19 Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, 21. 
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French Revolutionaries, for instance, created numerous festivals to express the meaning of 
their new French national identity. Kramer argues that ‘Revolutionary festivals … were 
designed to provide continuing political education for people who now had to learn the new 
national catechism.’20 Similarly, historians Warwick Frost and Jennifer Laing argue that the 
hundredth anniversary of the Signing of the Declaration of Independence in the USA was 
used to recreate a sense of national unity following the Civil War.21 In turn, national pride, 
brought about by reflections on the ‘nation’s past’, dampened dissent regarding the 
consequences of rapid industrialisation and population growth in the USA. Commemorative 
days were therefore an active component in the creation of national identity throughout the 
process of modernisation.22 
Of course, ideas regarding the heritage, values, and meaning of the nation, as 
presented on commemorative days, had to be created. Greenfeld highlights the role of 
intellectuals in this process. She argues that they were resentful because they felt that they 
lacked the social influence that they thought they deserved.23 They therefore sought to 
establish national identity as a cause to defend and develop. In this way, intellectuals carved 
out a place of public importance for themselves.  
Other scholars have subsequently expanded on the relationship between intellectuals 
and nationalism by exploring the role of academics in establishing myths about national 
cultures, and languages. Historian Stefan Berger, for instance, describes how historians in the 
nineteenth century saw it as their duty to serve the nation by writing its ‘history’. He points 
out that these historians helped establish national myths and foundational stories on a 
 
20 Kramer, Nationalism in Europe and America, 46. 
21 Warwick Frost and Jennifer Laing, Commemorative Events: Memory, Identities, Conflicts, (London: 
Routledge, 2013), 22. 
22 David Lowenthal, The past is a foreign country, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 319 – 321. 
23 Liah Greenfeld, ‘Nationalism and the Mind,’ Nations and Nationalism Vol 11(3) (2006), 325 – 341. 
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‘scientific basis’, despite the fact that they rarely corresponded to reality.24 Historian Roland 
Suny also points out that ‘history as a discipline helped to constitute the nation’.25 The 
intellectual construction of ‘national history’ was solidified in the public imagination through 
state-sponsored activities such as national commemorative days. The collaboration between 
historians and the state during the construction of the national narrative will be explored 
further in chapter four, where I discuss the Latvian government’s support for Latvian Legion 
Day. In short, historians helped construct and disseminate particular narratives that reinforced 
the concept of the nation in all states. Greenfeld, Berger, and Suny all ascribe intellectuals a 
central role in the creation of nationalism. 
Similarly, historians Eric Hobsbawm and Terrance Ranger, in The Invention of 
Tradition (1983), seek to show that many supposedly ‘ancient’ national traditions were 
invented by elites in the modern era. Indeed, they argue that social changes that occurred as a 
result of modernity probably destroyed the old customs which thus required the establishment 
of new traditions. According to Hobsbawm, this was done for the purpose of establishing 
authority, social control, and solidarity. These invented traditions imprinted certain values, 
beliefs and norms that created social identities. The traditions also created continuity with a 
mythical past and provided the rituals and symbols that were used by nationalists to unite and 
energise sections of modern society.26 We encounter an example of this in chapter two, in 
which I describe the Russian government’s use of invented rituals and traditions in the Red 
Square military parade.  
Carlton Hayes shows how academics were responsible for the incorporation of ethnic 
and cultural elements into nationalism in the first place. Hayes argues that German academics 
 
24 Stefan Berger, ‘On the Role of Myths and History in the Construction of National Identity in Modern 
Europe,’ European History Quarterly Vol 39(3) (July 2009), 491 – 492. 
25 Roland Suny, ‘History and the Making of Nations’, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Vol 22(1) (1998), 
569. 
26 Eric Hobsawm, ‘Introduction: Inventing Traditions,’ in The Invention of Tradition, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and 
Terence Ranger, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 2.  
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Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Johann Gottfried von Herder were especially important in this 
regard.27 According to Hayes, Herder was the first to argue that all nations had a distinctive 
historical tradition and an ‘appropriate language, literature, education, manner, and [set of] 
customs’ which formed ‘a kind of “national soul”’. Hayes claims that Herder also believed 
that every individual was marked by the character of their nationality which they inherited 
from their ancestors. Therefore, to Herder, nationality was not a matter of political loyalty but 
part of one’s ethnic heritage. Fichte, building on Herder’s work, went further by arguing that 
all individuals had a duty to protect their national language and culture from outside 
influences. Hayes claims that the work of Fichte and Herder together resulted in the 
development, in nineteenth-century Germany, of a new kind of ethnic nationalism. This 
variant emphasised common ethnic traditions and religious sensibilities as the foundation of 
social unity.28  
As a result, some scholars resort to an ethnic/civic dichotomy in order to describe the 
different methods by which nationalism was constructed. ‘Civic Nationalism’, which based 
the unity of the nation on a shared commitment to a political ideal, had developed out of 
Rousseau’s enlightenment ideals. It is inherently individualistic and opposed to 
authoritarianism. In the words of Greenfeld, the national ‘principle that emerged was 
individualistic: sovereignty of the people was the implication of the actual sovereignty of 
individuals; it was because these individuals (of the people) exercised sovereignty that they 
were members of a nation.’29 Thus, civic nationalism was supposedly inherently supportive 
of both individual identity and human diversity. On the other hand, ‘ethnic nationalism’ was 
reactionary and reinforced traditional social divisions on the grounds of the national good. It 
was also a closed form of nationalism. One can only inherit national membership via birth; it 
 
27 Hayes, Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, 13. 
28 Ibid., 84. 
29 Greenfeld, Nationalism, Five Roads to Modernity, 11. 
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cannot be acquired if one does not already have it nor can it be changed if one does.30 Where 
civic nationalism was associated by some historians with western Europe and post-revolution 
America, ethnic nationalism was associated with the national identities of pre-1945 Germany 
and Eastern Europe.31 Greenfeld most firmly establishes the distinctions between civic and 
ethnic nationalism in Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, but similar ideas can be found 
in the works of Hans Kohn, Carlton Hayes, and Peter Alter. 
This ethnic/civic dichotomy tends to inform the views of some academics when it 
comes to categorisations of nationalism as either liberal or illiberal. Historians such as Kohn, 
Hayes, and Greenfeld, are under no illusions regarding nationalism’s potential for 
xenophobia, authoritarianism and militarism—after all, both Kohn and Hayes were living and 
writing during the Nazis’ rise to power. Yet these tendencies are often passed off as features 
of ethnic nationalism, rather than of nationalism per se. Civic nationalism can therefore be 
separated from, and defined in opposition to, the genocides and war crimes caused by ethnic 
nationalism in the twentieth century. As stated in my introduction, Greenfeld argues that if 
nationalism returns to its civic roots, it could become a powerful force for the development of 
a liberal world order.32 Subsequently, these scholars argue that a transition from ethnic to 
civic nationalism is seen to be a good thing which will improve stability, economics, and 
democracy.33 Whether this claims is accurate or not is an ongoing theme in this thesis. 
Particularly in chapter two, the ability of civic nationalism to incorporate divergent minority 
views from the LGBT and non-Anglo-Australian communities will be explored. However, 
this theme is explored in all three of the following chapters. 
 
 
30 Ibid., 11. 
31 Kramer, Nationalism in Europe and America, 24. 
32 Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, 7. 
33 Harold Robert Isaacs, the Idols of the Tribe: Group identity and Political Change, (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1975), 178. 
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Nations and Collective Memory 
The claim that nationalism is simply an expression of the need to create a modernised 
economic workforce, or a post-enlightenment political society, does not fully explain the 
powerful emotional passions that nationalism inflames. Furthermore, the cultural meanings of 
nationalism generally go far beyond the economic and political. Nationalism engages with 
history and memory in a way that often have little or no economic or political value. This has 
caused some scholars to incorporate the study of collective memories and identities into the 
study of nationalism. Collective memory emphasises the central position of history in 
national identity. From this perspective, commemorative days are best understood as an 
expression of the common identity of a memory community.  
The discourse on collective memory essentially began with nineteenth-century 
sociologist Emile Durkheim, who argued that societies required a sense of connection and 
continuity with the past. In studying religious traditions, Durkheim came to the conclusion 
that certain symbols and rituals provided individuals with a sense of collective unity, or 
‘collective effervescence’. To Durkheim, proper collective thought exists only during a 
physical gathering of the community. Over time, however, groups develop a method through 
which the unity of the group could be maintained even after the group was disbanded. This 
method involved the use of ‘totems’, which were special items that were deemed to be 
sacred. Durkheim suggested that totems provide individuals with a device through which they 
could remember the unity of the effervescent group experience, and thus maintain that unity 
within their own minds. Although Durkheim claimed that the collective effervescence 
provided the transmittal of the past to the present, his emphasis was essentially based on the 
individual memories that comprise the larger collective memory. Durkheim’s collective 
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effervescence could not pass down through generations to individuals who had not 
participated in that group’s unity.34 
Sociologist Maurice Halbwachs built on Durkheim’s work by arguing that the 
memories of all individuals are constructed within the social structures and institutions into 
which they are born. He claimed that private individual memory can only be understood 
within a group context. Similarly, because individuals organise knowledge about the world 
within a social context, they order memory of the past through these same social categories. 
Halbwachs stated that collective memory depends on specific groups that are constrained by 
place and time. The social group constructs the memory and the individuals do the work of 
remembering. Halbwachs also expanded on Durkheim’s theory of totems. He suggested that 
temporal commemorative events, such as commemorative days, were also important ‘totems’ 
that served as a reminder of a collective memory. Halbwachs argued that commemorative 
events are important in reinforcing memories that would normally fade with time. 
Commemorative events encourage a periodic reinforcement of memory, so an event that 
occurred one hundred years ago could still be remembered by a generation temporally 
removed from its impact.35  
Ethno-symbolists, of whom sociologist Anthony D. Smith is the most influential and 
relevant, incorporate many of the ideas expressed in the study of collective memory into the 
study of nationalism. Smith accepts that the political concept of the nation-state is a modern 
phenomenon. However, he argues that national identities depended on long developing 
‘patterns of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that form the distinctive 
heritage of the nation’.36 According to Smith, national identities are rooted in an ‘enduring 
 
34 Emile Durkheim, The elementary forms of the religious life: A study in religious sociology, trans. Joseph 
Swain (New York: Macmillan, 1915) 
35 Maurice Halbwachs, On collective memory, trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 
1992. 
36 Anthony D. Smith, Chosen Peoples, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 24-25. 
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base of ethnic ties and sentiments’ and that ‘ethnicity forms an element of culture and social 
structure which persists over time’.37 These symbols and myths developed out of the real 
collective memory of an actually existing ethnic community. This, according to Smith, is the 
reason for nationalism’s powerful emotional appeal. To him, nations are social communities 
dependent on common, enduring memories of a shared past that are handed down from 
generation to generation, which Smith referred to as ‘ethnohistories’. Commemorative days 
are one of the vectors by which these stories are passed through the generations. They are a 
mechanism to encourage remembering and reflection on the national ‘ethnohistory’.38 
Smith opposes the modernists’ emphasis on ‘invented traditions’. He points out, 
perceptively I think, that politicians and cultural elites cannot simply invent stories or myths 
of the past to suit their purposes in the present.39 They rely on pre-existing stories. Thus, 
Smith places limits on the ability of intellectuals or politicians to shape national narratives. 
There is room for subjectivity and manipulation, but not total freedom to invent any story that 
suits the purposes of political elites. From Smith’s perspective, therefore, commemorative 
days are culturally constructed, but are established on the basis of an enduring ethnohistorical 
reality. Smith’s assertions implicitly lead to a less negative view of nationalism, which 
accepts it as the evolution of ethnic culture. Questions of liberal and illiberal nationalism are 
somewhat irrelevant in this analysis. Nationalism simply is. Whether it fits a liberal or 
illiberal narrative will depend on the pre-existing stories upon which the nation was formed. 
 Although many of Smith’s claims are useful, I believe he is mistaken in supposing the 
nation has deep roots. He accurately points out that many of the stories that nationalism 
depends on must conform to some historical reality. However, he confuses myth and 
memory, and he glosses over the malleable nature of narratives. ‘Ethnohistory’ cannot truly 
 
37 Ibid., 25 
38 Smith, ‘The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?’, 15-16. 
39 Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1-19. and 
Anthony D. Smith The Ethnic origins of Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). 
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exist because the meaning and moral of narratives are easily shaped and often rewritten 
through omissions or alternative interpretations. The ‘ancient’ symbols of a nation are not 
enduring. They go through a constant process of reinterpretation and reinvention. This is 
especially relevant when studying commemorative days, which change and evolve overtime 
alongside changes in the national narrative. The contested nature of these narratives is a key 
theme in this thesis. Both chapters two and three demonstrate the ways in which the Russian 
and the Australian national narratives have morphed overtime in accordance with social and 
political aims and needs. 
 
Contested Narratives 
Influenced by post-modernist thought, several scholars—most notably political scientist 
Benedict Anderson and critical theorist Homi Bhabha—argue that narrative is at the core of 
national identity.40 They argue that the nation is nothing more or less than a society bound 
together by a story of common unity, heritage, and traditions. However, in contrast to Smith’s 
claims, these theorists claim that the community is in fact imagined. Nations are not based on 
the reality of actually existing ethnic or cultural ties within a community, but rather on the 
idea that a particular group of people had certain ethnic and cultural ties. Stories of 
nationhood, therefore, are what made the nation. Such claims place the study of cultural 
rituals in a spotlight. Commemorative Days are important because they present the story of 
the nation. In so doing, they actively create and recreate the nation.  
 In his influential work on the nature of nationalism, Benedict Anderson argues that 
modern nations are imagined communities. Like Gellner, Anderson understands nationalism 
to be a product of modernity. He stresses the importance of modern capitalist systems, 
particularly communications technologies, in shaping the cultural context in which nations 
 
40 Bell, Mythscape: memory, mythology, and national identity, 68. 
5 
 
emerged. Nationalism depended on the ‘convergence of capitalism and print technology on 
the fatal diversity of human language’.41 However, Anderson’s key point is that nations are 
‘imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their 
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion.’42 Anderson points out that the national community is significantly larger 
than previous traditional communities (families, villages, geographical localities), but that it 
is possible to conceive it through the stories of commonality. These stories can take many 
different forms, from national history books, to national newspapers, or even national maps. 
National commemorative days are another way in which the story of national unity was told. 
The act of common commemoration helps embed the narrative of a common historical origin 
and of common values in the minds of the national people. These narratives of communion in 
turn contribute to the creation of a common national memory which reinforces the imagining 
of the nation.   
Homi Bhabha’s edited collection, Nation and Narration (1990), further develops the 
idea of the nation as a constructed historical narrative. Like many other scholars of 
nationalism, Bhabha emphasises the important role played by language, communication, and 
writers, in the construction of national identities. Yet, influenced by post-structuralist theory, 
he did not see any significant difference between national narratives and other kinds of 
discourse about the world. Like every other cultural practice (politics, literature, religion) 
Bhabha felt that the nation was a ‘text’, the meaning of which was constructed through 
narrative processes that resembled and included the narrative constructions of novels, films, 
and history books. However, the authors of these narratives strove for a level of internal order 
and coherence that could never be fully achieved because of the existence of contradictions 
 
41 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (London: 
Verso, 2006), 6-7. 
42 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6. 
6 
 
and ‘alien supplements’ that could not be integrated into the master narrative.43 A nation must 
therefore rely on assumptions and unacknowledged sources while simultaneously repressing 
or excluding those ideas, people, or issues that might call the nation’s assumptions into 
question. However, Bhabha also noted that nations depended on difference and thus required 
other nations to exist outside their borders. The complication was that these nations had their 
own historical narratives, which were often incompatible with the narratives told by other 
nations. Hence, these alternative narratives were an existential threat to the assumptions of 
one’s own national narrative. The end result is a level of internal anxiety as nationalist writers 
try to overcome this contradiction. The inevitable obstacles to coherence give nationalism a 
never-ending cultural campaign and a constant need to write and rewrite the story of the 
nation. However, it can never truly reach the totalising national unity that they seek.44 
Modern nations are created by constant processes of writing that can never fully overcome 
their own internal tensions. This theory will be explored in more detail in my fourth chapter 
on Anzac Day. 
 By regarding nationalism as a complex and contested narrative, the influence of 
collective memory can be incorporated into the analysis of national identity. Sociologist 
Duncan Bell sees memory as an important influence in the shaping of national identity. 
However, he argues that Smith and others confuse myth and memory, which leads to 
inaccurate conclusions about the nature of national identity. Indeed, Bell finds the entire 
phrase ‘collective memory’ to be misleading. Bell points out that memory is an individual, 
neurological process. It cannot be genetically passed down. ‘Memory’ cannot therefore be 
‘collective’.45 However, individual memories, in collaboration with similar memories of 
others, do contribute to the creation of mythical narratives, that are passed down through 
 
43 Homi K. Bhabha, ‘DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation,” in Nation and 
Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha, (London: Routledge, 1990), 297. 
44 Ibid., 297-9. 
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generations. These narratives by their nature are a homogenised conglomeration of the 
different individual memories that comprise it. Yet they are also shaped by external 
influences, such as the writings of certain historians and the opinions of certain powerful 
elites. However, not all memories conform to the same narrative. Bell speaks of a narrative 
‘mythscape’ in which many different and competing narratives exist. Bell explains that there 
is often a single ‘governing narrative’, which is held by a dominant group in society and 
which tend to be enforced by those in power. Yet, there are also ‘counter-narratives’ that can 
vary from, challenge, or even displace, the prevailing governing narrative. Memory, to Bell, 
is in a constant state of conflict as the dominant narrative struggles against challengers within 
groups who hold a different interpretation of the past. National identity is often formed, Bell 
argues, out of particular mythic narratives, but this can cause tensions when they are 
challenged by counter-narratives. The tensions that one sees during commemorative days, 
therefore, are often due to differences between the state-sponsored national governing-
narrative and the divergent stories of counter-narratives. We encounter examples of the 
interaction between governing-narratives and counter-narratives throughout the whole of this 
thesis.  
National identity, from this perspective, is created out of a negotiation between 
various different parties, with more or less power to act. Anderson points to the role of 
intellectuals. He states that all national narratives are influenced by intellectuals and that the 
emergence of an intellectual class precedes the emergence of nationalist ideologies. In 
nationalism outside of Europe, Anderson argues that ‘to an unprecedented extent the key 
spokesmen for colonial nationalism were lonely, bilingual intelligentsias unattached to sturdy 
local bourgeoisies’.46 However, Bell shows that the role of common people cannot be 
underestimated. It is, after all, the mass convergence of individual memories, however 
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selective, which forms the foundation upon which the governing narrative can be built. The 
interpretation of nationalism as a narrative demonstrates that national identity is constructed 
by both top-down and bottom-up forces. These forces mingle together to create a nationalism 
that is not monolithic but comprised of many different threads woven together into a larger 
tapestry of nationalism. In the words of Lloyd Kramer: ‘Nationalism comes to be understood 
as an ongoing political-cultural exchange and conflict among different people who develop 
contending accounts of the nation in which they live’.47 Expressions of nationalism in the 
public sphere, including on commemorative days, are comprised of many diverse stories, 
which are sometimes contradictory and often in conflict.  
National narratives can therefore try to be liberal and inclusive in certain contexts, but 
there will always be underlying illiberal and divisive elements. All expressions of nationalism 
are limited by the constraints of the narrative and of the idea of the nation. As Bhabha points 
about, the nation must always write itself in opposition to others and define itself by its 
difference to them.48 However, by doing so it places limits on the inclusiveness of national 
identity. One cannot identify as both British and French, if a key part of being British 
involves being different from the French.49 Similarly, while national identity formation 
involves the interplay of many different and competing narratives, only one of those 
narratives can be the governing narrative. This naturally involves a level of domination. 
Therefore, while some nationalism may be more tolerant of alternative identities than others, 
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Sources and Methodology 
While all the theoretical literature is highly important, it is the work by Anderson, Bhabha, 
and Bell that most influences this thesis. This is for two reasons. First, the focus on narrative 
best incorporates the involvement of commemorative days in the creation and replication of 
national identities. Kohn, Hayes, Gellner, and Greenfeld explore commemorative days with 
regards to its use by elites to shape memory. Smith, in my view erroneously, sees 
commemorative days as enduring symbols of actually existing memory. Anderson, Bhabha, 
and Bell see commemorative days as an active component in the writing and rewriting of the 
nation’s story. In this way, their theories provide greater scope to analyse the tensions when 
different groups come into conflict regarding the narrative expression of national identity. 
Second, the theories of Bell and Bhabha best describe the complex interactions between top-
down and bottom-up forces that are seen on commemorative days. In their view, the nation is 
a negotiated, rather than an imposed, narrative. In the following chapters, therefore, I will 
explore the negotiation of national narratives on commemorative days. By exploring the 
limits to these negotiations, I will demonstrate that nationalism is inherently limited in its 
ability to express a liberal outlook on the world. 
I will use three case studies to explore the tensions present during the negotiation of 
national narratives. These commemorations are Victory Day (9 May) in Russia, Anzac Day 
(25 April) in Australia, and the European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism 
and Stalinism (23 August) in the European Union. These days were chosen to give this study 
depth and geographical breadth, along with a sense of connection. All three days deal with 
war commemorations. Two of the days—Victory Day and the European Day of 
Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and Stalinism—are directly concerned with the 
commemoration of World War II. However, these two days have contradictory messages 
about the lessons and consequences of that war. Meanwhile, Anzac Day commemorates 
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World War I, although it has evolved to become a much broader commemoration of both war 
and of Australian nationhood. Therefore, Anzac Day and Victory Day share distinct 
similarities in that they are both unofficial national days. Furthermore, both Anzac Day and 
Victory Day incorporate the commemoration of the armed forces. The European Day of 
Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and Stalinism, on the other hand, is not a national 
day, but rather an attempt to create a supra-national narrative. Yet, it has so far failed to 
embed itself in European public memory culture due to competing national narrative in East 
and West Europe. Finally, Australia and most of the members of the European Union are 
liberal democracies. The governments of these states are keen to present their national 
narratives as liberal and inclusive. This allows me to explore how far they have succeeded on 
this front.  
This thesis draws on research from three kinds of primary sources. All three of them 
relate to commemorative days. However, each source presents a different perspective on the 
meaning and narrative of these commemorative days. Furthermore, it could be argued that 
each comes from a different social class. Therefore, in utilizing all three, this thesis cannot 
simply be said to be a ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ interpretation of commemorative days. 
Across each chapter I will incorporate all three primary sources, and contrast them with each 
other. The three kinds of primary sources were selected due to the fact that all three 
contribute significantly to the public discourse surrounding the negotiation of national 
commemorative days.  
 Transcripts and videos of political speeches presented by important politicians form 
one of my three core primary sources. Each chapter draws on a different series of political 
speeches. Chapter two draws heavily on the political speeches given by Vladimir Putin was 
part of the 9 May Victory Day celebrations in Red Square, Moscow. The speeches span the 
years 2012 to 2018. These speeches were translated directly by the Kremlin and made 
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available through the official website of the President of Russia. Video footage of the 
speeches was also captured by various media outlets, most prominently Russia Today. This 
footage provides visual context to many of the statements made by President Putin on the 
day. In Chapter three, most of the speeches were presented by major Australian politicians on 
the occasion of Anzac Day. Additionally, transcripts or video of political statements made at 
press conferences in response to issues relating to Anzac Day were also referred to. Chapter 
four draws on the political speeches made by Members of the European Parliament and 
delivered to the European Parliament. These speeches were made during discussion over the 
establishment of the European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and 
Stalinism. Despite the fact that the speeches were delivered in numerous European languages, 
they were all translated into English by official European Union translators, and it is the 
English translations to which I refer. Because these sources deal mostly with the perspectives 
of governing regimes or of high political elites, these sources provide what might 
traditionally be called a ‘top-down’ perspective. In other words, taken at face value, these 
sources generally present the nation’s ‘governing narrative’. However, as I seek to show, 
much of what is said in these speeches are informed and influenced by popular opinion, even 
as they seek to shape popular opinion themselves. 
This thesis also draws heavily on newspaper articles. Generally speaking, these 
articles were accessed through online news sites. However, in the case of Chapter three, I also 
accessed print newspapers. In Chapter two, most newspaper articles came from Russian news 
sources directed at English-language readers. Articles from Russia Today, and SputnikNews 
formed the core of this research. These news sites have occasionally been referred to as 
propaganda outlets for the Kremlin. There are also potential problems in that Russian news 
media has a tendency to report one thing in English language articles and another in Russian 
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language articles.50 However, this thesis is concerned with the way history is constructed and 
presented in a nationalist framework. Therefore, the ways in which these Kremlin-backed 
newspapers present narratives of the past serves as an excellent focus for analysis. Chapter 
three draws on newspaper articles from several major Australian newspapers―namely the 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the Guardian (Australia), the Sydney Morning Herald, 
the Australian, and the Daily Telegraph. This wide cross section of newspapers provides a 
spread of political perspectives across the left-right spectrum. This is important, as part of the 
aim of chapter three is to compare the narratives of the past between ‘progressive’ and 
‘conservative’ commentators. Chapter four refers in only a limited fashion to newspaper 
sources, generally as a method of cross-referencing statements made by politicians. 
My final set of primary sources is less traditional, namely, comments left by internet 
users on online public forms. This includes comments left on YouTube videos, comments on 
online newspaper articles, and comments on the ‘Talk’ page of Wikipedia articles. All of 
these comments should be treated with caution due to the nature of internet discourse.51 
However, as Seth Bernstein pointed out, historians should not shy away from them, but rather 
regard them in the same way one might view letters to the editor. As Bernstein says:  
 
scholars using digital sources must acknowledge the limitations of these materials and 
corroborate finds with other evidence. However, the Internet is the site of vibrant 
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These messages contribute in a meaningful way to the wider discourse on 
commemorative days and to avoid them would be problematic. In chapter two I draw mostly 
on YouTube comments posted on several Russia Today videos of the 2015 and 2016 Victory 
Day military parades in Red Square. These comments were coalesced into a database and 
assigned keywords to allow for some quantitative, as well as, qualitative analysis. Chapter 
four delves into Wikipedia comments on the ‘Talk’ pages of the European Day of 
Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and Stalinism and other related articles. My specific 
intention here is to explore the relationship between public and academic discourse. Chapter 
three relies on online comments to explore the kinds of accusations made against those who 
go against the dominant national narrative. These comments were drawn from online 




Chapter 2: Victory Day in Russia 
 
On 9 May 2012, in Russia, the 67th anniversary of the defeat of Nazism was marked by two 
very different commemorative events. The first was the Moscow Red Square Military Parade, 
presided over by the newly re-inaugurated president Vladimir Putin. In a tradition stretching 
back to the 1940s, more than 14,000 servicemen marched through Red Square in dress 
uniform, while tanks, armoured cars, missile launchers, and other pieces of military hardware 
drove in their wake. The parade, which took place in the shadow of Saint Basil’s Cathedral, 
was rich in ethnic, religious, and cultural imagery. The parade was a symbol of the military 
might of the Russian state and the national prestige of the country.  
Meanwhile, over 3,000 kilometres away in Tomsk, Siberia, nearly 6,000 people 
marched through the city carrying photographs of family members who had fought in, lived 
through, or died during the Great Patriotic War. This procession, which was called the 
‘Immortal Regiment’, had been organized at a grassroots level independently of official 
commemorations. It was the first time the Immortal Regiment had been held, but it would 
become a staple of Victory Day commemorations in the years to come. These two events 
together represented the key events of the 2012 Victory Day which would continue to 
influence World War II commemorations in Russia in the future.  
Although these two commemorations were very different, both were based on a very 
similar interpretation of the events of World War II. This interpretation was that the Nazis 
had invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 and had committed horrible, unprovoked atrocities 
against the Soviet people. In self-defence, the Soviet people had waged a bloody war which 
claimed the lives of millions and inflicted immense hardship on the population. At 
immeasurable cost, the Soviet people drove the Nazis back and ultimately triumphed in 1945. 
They thereby saved future generations from the horrors of National Socialism.  
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Though the official commemoration and the Immortal Regiment were similar in terms 
of narrative, they differed in terms of the way in which the past was remembered. The 
military parade had long been organised and controlled by Putin’s increasingly authoritarian 
government. It was cynically seen by some news media, such as the Moscow Times, as a 
symbol of loyalty to Putin and his nationalist agenda.53 The Immortal Regiment, on the other 
hand, represented an attempt by citizens to articulate their own relationship with Victory in 
1945 in a manner that was distinct from the governing narrative of the Kremlin. Where the 
Military Parade attempted to subsume all experiences into an homogenous national narrative, 
the Immortal Regiment gave voice to many diverse individual experiences. 
 The aim of this chapter is to explore the complex interactions between personal 
identity, individual memories, national identity, and governing narratives. In order to do this, 
I first explore theory regarding the potential for political and social elites to control 
commemorative memory. I then explore the history of the Red Square Military parade and its 
current use by the Russian government. In this section, I explore the extent to which Victory 
Day has been used by the authorities to legitimise their rule. This will be followed by a 
section on the Immortal Regiment, in which I investigate the tug-of-war between official and 
private memories. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the interplay between 
individualising personal memory and homogenising national identity. 
 
Memory, Commemoration, and Political control 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, there has been a revival of interest in the study of 
commemorative events and rituals in former-communist, Eastern European states. In the case 
of Russia, this literature has tended to focus on the government’s use and abuse of 
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commemorative practises in order to reinforce its own political legitimacy. This is especially 
the case regarding the scholarship that examines Victory Day on 9 May. For instance, in 
2011, Olga Procevska, Vita Zelče, and Klinta Ločmele explored the Russian government’s 
policies vis-à-vis national holidays and commemorations.54 In particular, the authors 
investigated the ways in which Victory Day was used as propaganda for President Putin in 
the context of Russo-Latvian relations. Similar explorations of Putin’s manipulation of 
Victory Day commemorations for his own personal gain can be seen in the work of Valerie 
Sperling and Elizabeth A. Wood.55 In 2017, Julie Fedor published a study of the Russian 
government’s attempts to appropriate the Immortal Regiment by imposing a nationalist 
‘nation-as-family’ framework on commemorative proceedings.56 As I discuss later in the 
section on the Red Square Military Parade, the claim that Putin uses Victory Day to reinforce 
his own legitimacy is perfectly valid. Authoritarian leaders habitually use commemorative 
days to impose their vision of the world upon their subjects. However, the complexities of 
collective memory imply that this process is more complex than a top-down exploration of 
memory might suggest. 
 It is widely accepted that the celebration of public holidays and commemorative dates 
help establish group unity and social order. In ordinary life, people exist as individuals. As 
Amitai Etzioni argues: ‘Profane (secular), routine, daily life, the conduct of instrumental 
activities at work, and carrying out household chores, tend to weaken shared commitments to 
beliefs and social bonds, and to enhance centrifugal individualism.’57 Therefore, without 
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periodic reinforcement, group identity eventually breaks down. As Etzioni states: ‘For 
societies to survive these centrifugal, individualistic tendencies, they must continuously 
recreate themselves by shoring up commitments to one shared (‘common’) set of beliefs and 
practices.’58 Holidays and mass public rituals provide a way for a social group to reaffirm its 
own existence.59 During public holidays, individuals get together, both in the physical and the 
abstract sense. They celebrate their connections, relationships, shared ideals, and moral 
principles through familial and national social rituals. They may attend parades together, sing 
patriotic songs, or just spend time in each other’s company. Whether consciously or not, this 
process reaffirms group bonds and ideals and helps to establish emotional solidarity between 
individuals.60 
 The celebration of commemorative rituals are also performative. As Peter Burke 
argues, they use ‘the language of the past to say something about the present’.61 The act of 
commemoration and of remembering is therefore an active process which makes claims about 
how a social group views itself in the present using the framework of memory. Erll and 
Rigney note that remembering is ‘as much a matter of acting out a relationship to the past 
from a particular point in the present as it is a matter of preserving and retrieving earlier 
stories’.62 It follows from this that commemorative rituals play an important role in the 
shaping of group identity. By remembering certain events through particular interpretations 
and by drawing attention to specific individual experiences and narrative tropes, 
commemorative days establish a broader framework through which group members are 
encouraged to examine their own personal or familial memories. Because personal memories 
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are an integral part of individual identity, personal identity is linked to group identity in this 
process. Yet, the broader interpretative framework establishes certain key tropes and 
normative value judgements in both the personal and group narrative which construct a larger 
system of ideas about the world and the social group’s place within it. The result is that 
commemorative rituals contributes to a blending of private and public memories alongside a 
blending of individual and group values. 
As Klinta Ločmele, Olga Procevska, and Vita Zelče suggest, holidays and mass 
rituals are particularly useful for political elites, who can use them to legitimise their power. 
As rituals provide a sense of group solidarity by linking group identity to a set of common 
values, politicians will often attempt to manipulate rituals in order to link those values with 
their own political ideology.63 They do this through the use of symbols. According to David 
Kertzer, political actors intentionally or unintentionally manipulate symbols during the 
political process. These symbols form the material basis of political power and help 
disseminate political myths. Public rituals on commemorative days are a vectors by which 
these political symbols are presented to the public.64 Thus, as Ločmele, Procevska, and Zelče 
argue, ‘Holidays are “invented” so as to create social cohesion, to establish and legitimize 
institutions of power and authorities, as well as to ensure the improvement of value systems 
and conventions of behaviour.’65 Furthermore, because public holidays and rituals must be 
given official status by politicians, it can be assumed that only those rituals which support the 
legitimacy of the governing regime are given space to be expressed. This is perhaps why 
radical changes to a country’s political system invariably result in changes to a country’s 
symbolic system and commemorative calendar.66 The new symbols reflect and represent the 
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new ideology of the political force that has taken power. They are identifiers of the new 
system.67  
 These claims are fairly uncontroversial, but, as Anthony Smith suggests, politicians 
are not the only actors who shape group identity on commemorative days. Smith places great 
weight on the role of memory in the creation of group identity. He notes that the ‘relationship 
of shared memories to collective cultural identity, and the cultivation of shared memory, 
almost by definition, is integral to cultural identity and the cultivation of shared memories is 
essential to the survival and destiny of such collective identities’.68 Indeed, ‘one might almost 
say: no memory, no identity’.69 Smith’s claims are of use here, for they suggest that 
politicians are constrained by the memories of the masses that they wish to manipulate. In 
general, politicians cannot simply invent new memories or commemorative regimes to fit 
their ideology. In the words of historian Heonik Kwon, official national history as written by 
social and political elites ‘only have meaning for the local people when they are integrated 
with local history’.70 The history of commemorative days is littered with the cadavers of dead 
symbols which held no real emotional resonance. This was the fate of many Soviet 
commemorative days which were quickly discarded following the collapse of the USSR.  
However, as Duncan Bell notes, memory mythscapes contain a complicated 
ecosystem of competing narratives. The government may construct a dominant, governing 
narrative which is dependent on the memories of a wide section of society. However, there 
will invariably be counter-narratives which call into question elements of the official 
governing narrative. In some cases, there may even be tensions between competing memories 
contained within the same narrative strand within the mythscape. Commemorative symbols 
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thus have the potential to cause significant dissonance between the government and the 
population over which they rule. This is true even under authoritarian states. In the case of 
Victory Day, it is certainly true that Putin and the Russian government use it to legitimise 
their current rule. However, the memories at the core of Victory Day celebrations have the 
potential to destabilise elements of the official Russian governing narrative. 
There are two themes which are worth drawing out before proceeding further. The 
first is the tension that arises between memory and memory mythscapes. Memories, while 
shaped in a social environment, are individual. Mythscapes, while built on an amalgamation 
of individual memories, are collective. For a memory mythscape to appeal as widely as 
possible, however, it must simplify and homogenise the individual memories that comprise it. 
Yet, because memories are individual, they have the potential to contradict the larger 
governing narrative by introducing alternative interpretations of historical events. Memory 
mythscapes thus depend on individual memory while also seeking to dominate and subsume 
them. There is, therefore, a perpetual tug-of-war between individualising memory and 
homogenising mythscapes. The second theme is that, while it is possible for authoritarian 
leaders to shape the broader national narrative or narrative mythscape, it is more difficult for 
them to influence individual personal memories. That is not to say that social forces have no 
influence on individual memory. However, personal memory appears to be remarkably 
resilient against forceful attempts to mould it. Both these themes are directly linked to the 
core question of this thesis. Whether or not memory mythscapes or governing-national 
narratives can incorporate divergent memories is central to the question regarding 






The History of the Red Square Parade  
In the following section, I will explore the history of Victory Day in the USSR and in Russia. 
Ever since it was first celebrated in 1945, the commemoration of Victory Day has held a 
great deal of meaning for the people of Russia and the Soviet Union. It has also routinely 
been used by the Soviet and the Russian governments as a source of political legitimacy. The 
precise focus given by respective governments to the commemoration of Victory Day has 
shifted over the years. Yet, victory over Nazism in World War II has always played a key 
role in the governing narrative of the post-war Soviet and Russian states. Because no state, no 
matter how authoritarian, can entirely dominate the mythscape, the commemorations of 
Victory Day have therefore often been a site of tension between unofficial private memories 
and official, governing narratives. 
The very first Victory Day parade was held shortly after the end of World War II in 
Europe on 24 June 1945. Georgii Zhukov, the Red Army’s most esteemed general, rode 
across Red Square astride a white horse, while Soviet soldiers threw Nazi banners at Stalin’s 
feet.71 In this first parade, Victory Day was used to turn triumph in the war into Stalin’s 
personal accomplishment. Pravda, the state-run newspaper, stated: ‘here today, the nation 
met Stalin’.72 The celebrations served as a chance for ‘the Soviet people [to] celebrate the 
soldiers of the valiant army, the army of victors, and celebrate the work of the great Stalin’.73 
Despite these attempts to marry victory in World War II to Stalin’s personality cult, Stalin 
himself demoted Victory Day from a state holiday to a working one. Academics disagree 
over exactly why he chose to do this. Some speculate that he was afraid the greatness of the 
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victory would eclipse his own.74 Others claim that Stalin was paranoid that Zhukov could 
become a rival through the celebration of the war. Either way, after 1947 Victory Day was 
swept under the rug by the Soviet government. Yet, it appears that many veterans and citizens 
continued to commemorate the day in private.75 Nonetheless, these early commemorative 
events by the Soviet state were clearly an attempt to associate personal identity and memory 
with loyalty to Stalin.  
After Stalin died, the official approach to Victory Day varied according to the 
political agenda of the leader of the USSR. Nikita Khrushchev, for instance, denounced 
Stalin’s use of victory in World War II as part of his personality cult.76 Although Khrushchev 
did not attempt to restore celebration of Victory Day, he did try to break the link between 
Stalin and victory in World War II. Victory Day was restored as a public holiday in 1965. 
After having removed Khrushchev from office, Leonid Brezhnev appears to have turned to 
Victory Day as a way of consolidating his regime’s legitimacy. Historian Maria Ferretti 
argues that personal memories of World War II were highly meaningful to the Soviet 
population in the 60s. Brezhnev tapped into it in order to promote Soviet patriotism and to 
reinvigorate support for the communist regime.77 Brezhnev re-established the parade on 9 
May and, for the next 20 years, the 9 May Victory Day parade served as a state performance 
of Communist power and national unity. Brezhnev did not try to rehabilitate Stalin after he 
had been denounced by Khrushchev. Instead, victory in 1945 became the ‘Great Victory of 
the Soviet people’ and the Communist Party.78 Brezhnev died in 1982 and was replaced 
briefly by Yuri Andropov (1982-1984), who was in turn replaced by Konstantin Chernenko 
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(1984-1985). Neither Andropov nor Chernenko made any meaningful changes to the Victory 
Day celebrations. All four of these leaders used Victory Day to encourage the Soviet people 
to nest their personal experiences within a governing narrative dominated by the Communist 
government. 
Then, in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. Although his initial Victory 
Day speeches as General Secretary followed Brezhnev’s rhetoric, the policy of glasnost 
weakened the state’s control over the memory of Victory Day. As a result, other groups were 
able publicly to articulate their relationship with the past and with World War II.79 In 1990, 
Gorbachev oversaw a heavily toned-down Victory Day parade that focused on overcoming 
the Soviet people’s current difficulties, while remembering the lessons and tragedies of war.80 
Gorbachev’s decision was an attempt to develop a new political identity. However, this new 
identity was supposed to be more individualistic and less state-oriented. In other words, it 
was an attempt to develop a more democratic, Western, civic nationalism. This focus on 
individual identity, however, coincided with a collapse of state power. 
As official government control over public memory culture slackened, dissident 
voices—which had hitherto been suppressed—began to be heard. Hanging over the 1990 
Victory Day celebration was a newspaper article entitled ‘Stolen Victory’ publish in 
Literaturnaia gazeta (Literary Newspaper). The article included a quote from a veteran that 
claimed that ‘they’ve stolen our Victory’. ‘They’ referred to the Soviet governments—both 
Stalin’s and the others’—that had commandeered the holiday for political purposes.81 The 
veterans also accused the government of having built a myth of victory rather than taking 
care of those who had won it. The article opened the floodgates of memory, and differing 
interpretations of World War II (and the party’s role in it) came into conflict. In turn, the 
 
79 Wolfe, ‘Past as Present, Myth, or History?,’ 272 – 273. 
80 Norris, ‘Memory for Sale,’ 208. 
81 Quoted in Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia, 
(New York: Basic Books, 1994), 202. 
24 
 
official narrative was destabilised. Some even argued for the return of Stalin to the Victory 
Day narrative. Members of the newly reformed Communist Party in particular argued that 
Soviet citizens had fought for both Stalin and the motherland.82 The conflict here between 
private memory and collective memory would be echoed later in the conflict between the Red 
Square military parade and the Immortal Regiment. It also goes some way to explaining the 
fervour with which the current Russian government defends the state narrative of Victory 
Day. 
As the conflict and confusion over Victory Day’s memory increased amid the 
breakdown of the USSR, Russia’s new President, Boris Yeltsin, decided to cancel the official 
Red Square parade in 1992. Instead, he supported private, informal celebrations. Yeltsin’s 
opponents consequently held a Victory Day rally in 1993, complete with a picture of Stalin.83 
As Yeltsin’s approval ratings plummeted, he reintroduced the Red Square parade in 1995. He 
allowed many Soviet symbols to be displayed in the parade alongside the Russian tricolour. 
He also used the traditional Victory Day speech to try to create continuity between the 
struggles of World War II and the struggles of the present. By using these symbols, Yeltsin’s 
intention was no doubt to try to recover some of his lost popularity. It did not work. Liberal 
newspapers condemned the return of Soviet symbolism. Meanwhile, the Communist Party 
and its supporters held their own Victory Day commemorations, in which Stalin’s image was 
front and centre as the Great Leader of the great Victory.84 In the face of falling popularity, 
Yeltsin ultimately resigned on New Year’s Eve, 1999. His successor was Vladimir Putin. 
 Before we explore the contemporary Russian government’s governing narrative as it 
is presented on Victory Day, I wish to reflect on some implications that can be drawn from 
the history of World War II commemorations. First, it is clear that the memory of Victory 
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Day is a very powerful tool which can be utilised by the government in power. This stems 
from the strength of the individual memories of Soviet and Russian citizens who experienced 
the horrors of war from 1941 to 1945. It is for this reason that both Brezhnev and Yeltsin 
turned to Victory Day while they were trying to legitimise their respective regimes. However, 
in each case the government only ever manipulates the governing narrative of World War II. 
Individual memories potentially remain discordant. Even Stalin’s notoriously oppressive 
regime was not able to succeed in permanently modifying individual memories into a larger 
pro-Stalinist framework. Finally, it is worth noting that, at many points in the history of 
Victory Day, these divergent memories have threatened the governing narrative of the state. 
In Stalin’s time, the role of Zhukov called into question Stalin’s position as the chief architect 
of Soviet victory. In the time of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, the question of Stalin’s role in the 
war created difficulties for the governing narrative which wanted to downplay his 
contribution. Therefore, so long as the memories of World War II as expressed on Victory 
Day are kept under control, they can be extremely powerful for the government. But, the 
reality of existing divergent experiences and memories in the larger World War II mythscape 
have the potential to cause significant societal upheaval if they are turned against the 
governing regime. 
 
Putin’s Red Square Parade 
The contemporary Russian government has used the memory of World War II as a source of 
state legitimacy and a focal point for national unity to an even greater extent than its 
predecessors. Putin’s governing narrative of Victory Day now dominates public memory 
culture in Russia. The governing narrative attempts to subsume the memories and 
experiences of Soviet citizens in World War II in a narrative that focuses on the achievements 
of the Soviet and Russian armed forces. It articulates a world view that emphasises the 
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importance of military strength, sacrifice for the nation, and national unity in the face of 
external threats. The means by which the Russian government disseminates this narrative 
does not give space to the expression of more personal narratives.  
 Academics have noted the focus on the history of the military in nationalist Russian 
discourse since the early 2000s. Valerie Sperling postulated in 2003 that the Russian state 
leadership was using a form of militaristic patriotism as a means to generate popular 
support.85 This trend has continued into the 2010s, particularly after Putin’s controversial 
return to the presidency in 2012. The central focus on the armed forces as a symbol of 
national unity was a logical choice, as it was one of the few institutions in which the people 
of Russia held faith during the transition from Yeltsin to Putin. In a number of surveys 
conducted in 1993, the army was the only state institution trusted by more than 60 per cent of 
the population.86 This made it the most trusted of all government organisations at the time.87 
The Russian armed forces were one of the only institutions that could embrace its Soviet 
lineage without tarnishing its reputation. Victory in 1945 is one of the few moments from the 
Soviet period in which contemporary Russian citizens feel unambiguous pride.88 Moreover, 
the armed forces are also not explicitly linked to any particular ethnic group, and Russian 
citizenship who are not of Russian ethnicity can also identify with the Red Army soldiers of 
World War II. This appeases Russian nationalists without excluding non-Russian minorities 
and makes it an effective rallying point for popular support.  
Yet there is also nationalist logic behind the celebration of the military as a symbol of 
national unity. The armed forces, as an institution, have always embodied key nationalist 
ideals. Soldiers, for instance, are taught to put the needs of the nation or national community 
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above their own personal wants or desires. It is their duty, they are told, to ensure the survival 
of the nation through their willingness to fight and potentially sacrifice their lives.89 Disunity, 
both in the armed forces and in the wider national community, is a weakness for the military 
which is to be discouraged. Likewise, as Kramer points out, nationalists believe that ‘No 
matter how much a nation might disagree or differ between themselves … their essential 
unity [is] necessary in the face of external threats.’ Links between nationalism and warfare 
have therefore always been strong, and nationalist culture in most countries has often 
contained strong military elements, including in art, flags, parades, uniforms, and national 
anthems.90 Indeed, as Eugene Weber points out, conscription and martial education was an 
important part of the nation-building projects of nineteenth century states.91 As we shall see 
in the following chapter, celebration of martial prowess is also a core feature of the governing 
narrative in Australian public memory culture. The explicit celebration of the military on 
national days, therefore, serves to strengthen these ties between national identity and the 
armed forces. It also highlights militaristic values to the wider society and implicitly idealises 
them as the ultimate expression of love for one’s country.  
 The commemoration of the military on Victory Day is not unique to Putin’s Russia, 
but the contemporary Russian government has, in recent years, increased the prominence of 
the armed forces during commemorations. This can partly be seen in the increasing numbers 
of military personal and hardware on display during the Red Square parade. In 1997, under 
Yeltsin, 5,000 servicemen participated in the Red Square parade. By 2008, this number had 
nearly doubled to 11,000 servicemen. The years 2012 and 2015 featured even larger numbers. 
Around 14,000 servicemen marched in 2012 and over 16,000 marched in 2015. As 2015 was 
the 70th anniversary of the defeat of Nazism, the large size of the parade was not unexpected. 
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The reason for the large numbers at the 2012 parade, on the other hand, is not immediately 
clear. It might have been related to Putin’s return to the Russian presidency two days earlier, 
but this is speculation. Military vehicles and other pieces of military hardware also made a 
notable return. In 2008, the parade featured military vehicles for the first time since the 
collapse of the USSR. By 2017, 114 units of military equipment rumbled through Red 
Square. At the head of the column was a T-34 tank, a symbol of Soviet fighting prowess 
during World War II. Modern technology, such as the Iskander-M missile system and the 
‘cutting-edge’ Yars missile systems, were also on display in order to emphasise Russia’s 
contemporary military strength.92  
 The focus on the armed forces can also be seen in the rhetoric of high-ranking 
government officials, who envisage the parade as an expression of Russian military strength. 
In 2017, for example, the parade incorporated an inspection of troops by Minister for Defence 
General, Sergey Shoygu. During the inspection, Shoygu spoke of Russia’s military 
capabilities during the inspection and emphasised that ‘Russia’s armed forces … 
demonstrated a high level of combat skills’ and that ‘[the] officers and soldiers [of Russia] 
are ready to complete any mission.’ He drew attention to the new items of military hardware 
procured by the armed forces, including ‘more than 6,000 new items of hardware, including 
more than 470 armoured vehicles, 130 aircraft, and 40 Navy vessels.’93 Shoygu’s speech 
formed part of a broader discourse that occurs on Victory Day which seeks to place in 
parallel Russian military prowess and Russian national strength. For instance, on Victory Day 
in 2008, Dmitry Medvedev had stated that ‘our Armed Forces are growing stronger, like 
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Russia itself’.94 More tellingly, Vladimir Putin had stated in 2001 that ‘the strength of Russia 
depends on the strength of the army’. 95 
The imagery of marching servicemen in the Red Square parade, alongside the rhetoric 
of officials, is a performative act that leads to a narrative which emphasises continuity 
between the memories of World War II and the experiences of contemporary soldiers. Putin 
himself explicitly emphasises a connection between the current generation of soldiers and 
what he consistently refers to as the ‘generation of victors’. According to Putin, while the 
military veterans are ‘the main heroes of the Great Victory Day’, the ‘soldiers 
and commanders [of today] have proven that they are worthy successors of the Great Patriotic 
War heroes’. In his words, this is because they continue to ‘honourably protect the interests 
of Russia’96. Medvedev, in his turn, references continuity between past and present by stating 
that the current strength of the Russian Armed forces ‘continues the glorious history of 
Russia’s military, carrying on the victorious traditions and high morale of our army’.97 
Language such as this sets the tone for the official commemorations of World War II in 
Russia. What is emphasised is a sense of connection to the past through the actions of the 
contemporary armed forces. By doing this, soldiers and the memories of past soldiers, are 
given a privilege position in the national narrative. 
The narrative of continuity which focuses on military experience is underscored in 
much of the performative practices and symbolism present on the day. For instance, in 2007 
President Putin passed a law that allowed replicas of the Soviet ‘Victory Banner’, complete 
with the hammer and sickle, to be used by any individual or organisation honouring the 
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memory of World War II. The Victory Banner is flown on Victory Day in unison with replica 
Soviet military uniforms worn by some regiments during the Victory Day parade. As Jenny 
Thompson has noted, these artefacts allow those who display them to claim authenticity for 
their nationalist narrative. The potency of the ‘Victory Banner’ also allows the presentation of 
the Russian World War II experience as a ‘Glorious Victory’. At a deeper level, however, the 
replicas on display make a link between past and present and establish continuity between the 
victory of the past and contemporary military pride. Part of this can be seen in the fact that it 
is considered to be performativity proper for Russian Children to wear replica uniforms on 
Victory Day as part of the celebrations. By doing so, they prioritise the governing narrative of 
military strength over family memories which may not be as focused on the military 
experience. These links between past and present generations encourage a feeling of 
continuity and national lineage that is essential to all forms of nationalism.  
The focus given to the military on Victory Day contributes to a deeper embedding of 
individual Russian memory in a broader governing narrative of Russian history. The fact that 
the Russian government puts a central focus on the military during Victory Day, both through 
official rhetoric and the centrality of the military parade, demonstrates the predominance of 
the military experience in the Russian governing narrative. Indeed, Putin explicitly 
emphasises that, to the Russian government, ‘main heroes of Victory Day’ are the soldiers 
and veterans of Russia and the Soviet Union.98 This claim would be innocuous enough if 
Victory Day were purely a day for the recognition of the sacrifices of soldiers past and 
present. However, because Victory Day is also Russia’s main national day, it becomes part of 
a broader interpretive framework which links military experience to national experience. 
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Individuals are therefore encouraged to nest their personal memories and identities into a 
larger narrative of Russian military supremacy.  
Looming over this narrative is the sense that military identity is inherently anti-
individualist. The military depends on the suppression of individual identity in order to create 
soldiers who are loyal to their unit, who respect authority, and who are willing to obey orders 
unquestioningly. In the army this fosters a strict hierarchy which is considered necessary for 
winning wars. The military achieves this through the regulation of specific behaviours: 
individuals are referred to by rank rather than first name, uniforms are worn, personal 
grooming and presentation is highly regulated, and specific forms of conduct are enforced. 
All of this contributes to the formation of a social identity which suppresses individualism in 
order to best support military functions. Putin and the Russian government, by emphasising 
the importance of military identity and military strength for Russian national strength and 
security, are linking and mixing military identity with national identity. This implicitly 
encourages civic society to emulate the military in the suppression of individualism for the 
national good. It is not surprising that Medvedev stated: ‘Dear veterans, it is from you that we 
learn to live and be victorious in the name of our Fatherland.’99 Indeed, at every level of the 
Red Square military parade, one can see the homogenization of individual identities and their 
subordination to the collective national identity. Just as the military must suppress individual 
identity in order for those soldiers to survive in combat situations, so too must the citizens of 
Russia suppress individual identity in order to defend the motherland.  
 The attempt to replace personal memory with homogenised national memory is 
complicated, however, when discussing suffering and loss in World War II. Victory Day 
raises a complex question for the people of Russia: Should World War II commemorations be 
a celebration of victory or an expression of mourning for those who suffered or died during 
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the war? This is a question which accompanies almost all rituals of war commemoration 
across the world,100 but it is particularly pertinent in post-Soviet Russia.101 Technically, 
Victory Day is the day when victory in 1945 is celebrated and the 22 June (the Day of 
Memory and Mourning) is the day for solemn remembrance. In reality, these two 
experiences—victory and suffering—cannot be separated in the memories of individuals. 
Hence, Victory Day pulls double duty and represents, in Putin’s words, the day ‘in which joy, 
memory, and mourning are merged together as one’.102 Yet, while Putin and Russian 
government recognise the ‘millions killed in that ruthless war … who remain forever on the 
battlefield’,103 the exploration of personal suffering does not go particularly deep. Suffering is 
talked of largely in general terms without reference to specific cases or experiences. This is 
partly because an exploration of personal wartime hardship would raise difficult questions 
regarding the culpability of the Red Army and the Soviet government for, among other 
things, the USSR’s extremely high casualty rate. It might also once again raise the issue of 
the Soviet state’s post-war neglect of veterans and the war dead as happened during 
Gorbachev’s time.104 Perhaps most problematically of all, however, a focus on personal 
suffering draws attention to the diversity of wartime experiences, individualises people, and 
hence detracts from the emphasis on Russian national unity. 
Therefore, the commemoration of suffering in World War II in official terms is 
situated within a narrative of historic national suffering at the hands of western invaders. In 
the words of Maria Ferretti, victory over Nazism in 1945 is reduced to ‘one more 
manifestation of the eternal heroism of the Russian people, fighting for the liberation of their 
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country from … the last in a chain of various conquerors’.105 The clear resonance of this 
interpretation of Russian history can be seen most overtly in the popularity of the YouTube 
video ‘Russian Occupant’, an independent Russian propaganda film which went viral in 
2015.106 Here, the victory over the Nazis in 1945 is located alongside the ‘atrocities of the 
Polish invaders during the Time of Troubles’ and the burning of Moscow in order to defeat 
Napoleon in 1812. Throughout this narrative, the army is given the central role as the 
defender of the Russian nation from these threats. Putin’s take away message is therefore 
that: ‘Life itself demands from us that we must increase our defence potential.’107 The 
experience of suffering is here expunged of its individual character. Hardship, loss of life, 
and the intrusion of war on everyday life in this framework are worth experiencing if it will 
ultimately protect the nation. 
At the core of the official Victory Day celebrations is a homogenising governing 
narrative. The central point of reference in these commemorations is the nation, and the role 
of soldiers in protecting it. The experience of the soldier is elevated in official 
commemorations and presented as the universal war experience. Alternative experience, such 
as the role of women, or children, are not exactly suppressed, but it is certainly not given 
much space for expression. The governing narrative is fundamentally homogenising and 
ignores the realities of individual experiences. 
 
The Immortal Regiment 
While the Red Square Military parade is an expression of national unity that seeks to 
homogenise historical memory, the Immortal Regiment restores individual memory and 
representation to the commemoration of World War II. In order to commemorate the 
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Immortal Regiment, individuals march through the streets carrying portraits of family 
members who were involved in the Great Patriotic War. The event is hugely popular in 
Russia partly because so many people have parents, grandparents or great-grandparents who 
fought in the war. However, as we shall see, the Immortal Regiment has also successfully 
spread to other countries. By 2018, Russian newspapers were referring to it as a ‘Victory Day 
tradition in Russia, where the war left almost no family untouched’.108 
To those who participate in the Immortal Regiment, the march represents a chance to 
articulate their personal or familial connections to those who fought, suffered, and died in the 
fight against Nazism. The portraits that are held up by marchers are not just images of 
veterans. They are representative of intimate family stories which hold deep personal 
meaning to those who express them. In many cases these connections are exceptionally close. 
For instance, one woman interviewed by the video news agency Ruptly was carrying a picture 
of her father, Gorin Ivan Petrovich. During the interview, she shared a little about his history. 
He was ‘a veteran of the Great Patriotic War. He served in Belorussia, Poland, and Germany. 
He was badly wounded in action but nonetheless survived the war. He died in 2003.’109 In 
other cases, the individuals who are commemorated are more distantly related, but are clearly 
still part of a family’s mythology. For instance, one young woman who was interviewed 
revealed what she was carrying a portrait of her great-grandfather who ‘was a partisan in 
Kuban. He survived the war [but] I do not remember him. I was little when he died but from 
what I’ve heard about him in stories, I love him and am very proud of him.’110 
It is also noteworthy that the family stories which are remembered during the march 
are not always consistent with the official narrative of the Russian government. In one case, a 
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woman who was carrying a portrait of her grandfather noted that ‘in 1943 he was captured 
and was sent to a concentration camp in Germany until 1945’. Very little is said in the official 
narrative about the vast numbers of Soviet citizens who were captured by the German army 
or deported to the Third Reich as slave workers. The fact that many soldiers were captured 
and imprisoned by the Wehrmacht does not reflect or develop the narrative of heroism and 
martial strength expressed in official commemorations of World War II. Stalin himself 
equated surrender with treason and, as a result, those Soviet POWs and deportees who 
survived the war were of subject to persecution once they returned to the USSR.111 The poor 
treatment of former POWs and deportees is completely absent from official narratives, but it 
is still remembered in families. The fact that this woman was still reflecting on the memory 
of her grandfather because ‘he was a very nice grandfather’ is demonstrative of this.112 Other 
examples include a man commemorating his grandfather who ‘survived a POW camp after 
being captured in 1944’.113  
The individual element was, from the very beginning, central to the Immortal 
Regiment. According to most accounts, the Immortal Regiment started in the Siberian Town 
of Tomsk in 2012. The initiators, Sergei Lapenkov, Sergei Kolotovkin, and Igor Dmitriyev, 
stated that they felt the official Victory Day commemorations had become too militarised and 
triumphal and had begun to lose its truth.114 This was exacerbated by the fact that many of the 
World War II veterans who had once marched in the parade were dying out or getting too old 
to participate. The initiators decided that they ‘wanted to return the holiday to the main 
hero—to the person who experience the war and to whom we are ultimately grateful for the 
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fact that we are alive today’.115 They used an independent, local radio station to spread the 
idea before Victory Day. On the day, 6,000 people apparently turned out to march with 
pictures of their family members who had fought in the war. The idea proved to be infectious 
and quickly spread throughout Russia. In 2013, the Immortal Regiment paraded through over 
100 different Russian towns. In 2014, Immortal Regiment parades were reported in 500 
different towns. By 2016, Immortal Regiment parade had spread abroad, with marches 
reported in Australia, Canada, China, Estonia, France, Germany, Israel, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Lebanon, Spain, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. This was 
achieved mostly through copycat movements, which were encouraged by the initiators.116  
The Immortal Regiment was subversive in its early years for several reasons. First, 
the central focus on individual stories and individual rights threatened the official nationalist 
narrative, which prioritised the experiences of male Russian soldiers above all others. It did 
this by introducing personal narratives which often ran counter to the governing narrative. By 
exploring these individual stories, the vast differences in war experience could be expressed 
and the government’s homogenised story called into question. This could be via the 
expression of experiences which were not highlighted in the government’s version of events, 
such as that described by the woman whose grandfather was captured by the German army. 
However, it could also highlight the involvement of groups in society whose role the 
government downplayed, such as women, workers, partisans, or non-Russian minorities. 
Second, the international spread of Victory Day, especially to Western countries such as 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, reveal certain tensions. 
Immortal Regiment marches in other countries are approved of by the Russian state and are 
positively reported in Russian media. However, these Immortal Regiment marches are 
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outside Russia and are therefore not under the control of the Kremlin. This makes them 
somewhat unpredictable for the Kremlin in terms of the narratives which are presented and 
represented. Finally, as Gabowitch argues, the fact that the initiative was initially created by 
liberals and spread by independent media and grassroots organisations was, and remains, an 
ideological thorn in the government’s side considering their opposition to such initiatives.117 
In light of their desire to demand unity and loyalty to the government, any organisation with 
such mass popularity outside of the control of the governments is threatening. 
With its growing popularity and subversive undertones, the Immortal Regiment 
attracted the government’s attention. The government quickly appropriated the initiative, 
while trying to discrediting the initiators. In May 2015, state-run newspapers accused 
Lapenkov, Kolotovkin, and Dmitriyev of having stolen the idea from a retired policeman in 
Tyumen, who claimed to have come up with the idea in 2007.118 Subsequently, Russia Today 
and other government-run media outlets insisted that the Immortal Regiment began in 2007, 
rather than in 2012. According to Gabowitch, such attacks follow an established Russian 
government tradition and are designed to conceal the subversive origins of the Immortal 
Regiment’s history.119 Additionally, due to the decentralised nature of the Immortal 
Regiment, government authorities have been able to infiltrate many of the copycat 
movements responsible for organising the parade in key towns and cities. For instance, in 
2015 Nikolai Zemtsov—the organiser in Moscow and a Communist Party deputy in 
Moscow’s local parliament—allowed Russian state and para-state organisations to 
appropriate the initiative against the will of the initiators. Zemtsov eventually set up his own, 
parallel organisation called ‘The Immortal Regiment of Russia’, which organises events in 
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Moscow. 120The event is incorporated into official commemorations and Putin himself now 
marches with the crowd carrying a portrait of his father. However, the Russian news media 
does not make it clear that these parallel organisations exist. Contradictory reports in different 
newspapers claim that the movement is under the control of the initiators, Zemtsov, the 
government, and the para-government organisation the All-Russia People’s Front, whose 
leader is Vladimir Putin.121  
The three founders have criticised the state co-option of the Immortal Regiment in 
several liberal Russian newspapers. They argue that the movement has been subjected to a 
‘soft takeover’ by Kremlin authorities, and point to the fact that children are forced to attend 
the processions as part of school projects.122 In 2015, liberal critics took photos of stacks of 
portraits apparently thrown away after the march as evidence that state authorities had 
coerced random people into the parade to boost numbers.123 Critics of the Immortal 
Regiment, especially in the West, argue that movement has lost its initial meaning. To them, 
it is no longer a commemoration of private individuals mourning private memories. An 
article in the Washington Post in 2017, for instance, stated that ‘the [Immortal Regiment] has 
been appropriated by Putin’s government and … have become as much a part of official 
celebrations as tanks and nuclear missiles’.124 In the same article, Andrei Kolesnikov, a senior 
associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center, argued that ‘The administration has nationalised a 
private memorial, and intercepted its agenda. Now it’s officious, mandatory, something 
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imposed from above.’125 Meanwhile, Euromaidan Press denounced the spread of the 
Immortal Regiment to Toronto as ‘Putin propaganda, planned and executed in the best 
traditions of the Soviet times’.126 
Yet these interpretations of the Immortal Regiment are overly cynical. While it is 
important to note that the Immortal Regiment initiative has been infiltrated by authorities, it 
still retains subversive elements due to the liberal ideals embedded in it by Lapenkov, 
Kolotovkin, and Dmitriyev. The success of the original idea and the efficacy of its spread is 
due to the fact that it provides a framework through which individuals can express their 
personal connections to the war generation. While it is possible that the Russian government 
coerces random people into marching in order to boost numbers, most people seem to turn 
out for the same reason as those who marched in 2012. Personal narratives are still an integral 
part of the Immortal Regiment. This is most notable when marches occur in those places 
where the Russian government does not hold sway and where any sign that could be 
interpreted as loyalty to Russia is politically disadvantageous, such as in Ukraine or the Baltic 
states. Furthermore, by incorporating the Immortal Regiment into official state 
commemorations, Putin and his supporters are implicitly accepting the fact that the military 
parade does not fully satisfy the desire of individuals and families to commemorate 
individual people. At a certain level, the popularity of the Immortal Regiment demonstrates 
the reality that the government’s official commemorations are limited in their popular appeal. 
Finally, by incorporating the Immortal Regiment into official proceedings, time and focus has 
been taken away from the military parade, and thus from the government’s preferred 
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narrative framework of commemoration. The Regiment still therefore prioritises the 
memories of the people over the memories of elites or the state.  
The fact that the government has chosen to embrace the Immortal Regiment is all the 
more noteworthy when one considers its subversive core. There are at least three reasons why 
the government has not cracked down on Immortal Regiment. First, because Putin has put 
such emphasis on World War II memory as a symbol of Russian national identity, it would be 
impossible for the government to justify overt hostility towards any commemoration of it. 
The Immortal Regiment, though potentially subversive in its methods of commemoration, 
still commemorates the same narrative of World War II that is propagated by the state. 
Second, the Immortal Regiment is potentially very useful to the government if it can be 
controlled. With Victory Day commemorations at the core of Putin’s official nationalism, the 
perception that the people support his version of history is propaganda gold. Finally, even in 
an authoritarian country like Russia, the government cannot simply dictate collective 
memory. As Smith’s theories point out, individual experiences place limits on the extent to 
which the government can shape the collective narrative. The narrative must still conform to 
a foundation of memory. There must therefore instead be negotiation. The Immortal 
Regiment represents the Russian government’s attempts to appease the public’s desire for 
individual commemoration, whilst attempting to remove its subversive content.  
 The partial absorption of the Immortal Regiment into the Russian government’s 
official commemorations demonstrates the conflict between private individualising memories 
and the homogenising state-sponsored narrative. Where the official government 
commemoration seeks to incorporate all experience into a single narrative of Russian unity, 
the Immortal Regiment revels in the complexity and diversity of historical experiences. This 
makes it a protest movement in disguise. Those who march probably do not perceive 
themselves as protesters. Yet by marching they are implicitly emphasising the importance of 
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private individual memories to war commemoration. In turn, they are implicitly rejecting 
what Liah Greenfeld would refer to as the attempt to ‘interpret the collective will … by the 
select few [who] dictate to the masses’.127 Thus, despite commemorating the same 
interpretation of the events of history as the Russian state, it is not surprising that the Russian 
government would quickly seek to co-opt and control the Immortal Regiment. In the context 
of official Russian, expressions of individuality are potentially an existential threat to the 
supposed unity of the nation. 
 
Conclusion 
The Victory Day Red Square Parade and the Immortal Regiment March demonstrates several 
points that are already well known to scholars of nationalism and memory. First, as has been 
argued by other scholars, the Red Square Parade is a sharp example of the tendency for ruling 
regimes to manipulate historical memory in service to the politics of the present. In the case 
of Russia, this has been expressed through the militarisation of World War II memory. The 
experiences of the male, Russian soldier are given primacy in official commemorations to the 
extent where alternative memories are sidelined and devalued. These actions are in service to 
the Kremlin’s contemporary national narrative of Russia as a strong, military state with a 
long history of success in glorious combat. It also contributes to a narrative of Russian 
hardiness in the face of adversity imposed on the nation by external forces.  
On the other hand, the case of the Immortal Regiment demonstrates that, as Duncan 
Bell argues, there are always tensions in the mythscape, not just between rival narrative 
strands, but also within narrative strands. The Immortal Regiment was formed in response to 
the failure of official commemorations to adequately engaged with people’s desire for the 
personal memorialisation of their loved ones. The event that was introduced in order to 
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rectify this problem therefore placed those personal stories at the heart of its commemorative 
rituals. By doing so, however, the Immortal Regiment turned over the rock of official 
narrative to reveal thousands of wriggling individual stories, some incompatible with the 
governing myth.  
This reality demonstrates a number of core inconsistencies at the heart of national 
narrative which ultimately call into question Liah Greenfeld’s assertions about the potential 
for nationalism to be liberal and inclusive. As already stated, the Red Square Parade revels a 
homogenising impetus at the core of the official narrative, which stems from a need to create 
an image of a unified nation. An inescapable consequence of this is that particular memories 
are suppressed or excluded when the national narrative is presented during commemorations. 
Yet, as the Immortal Regiment reveals, national narrative must incorporate personal memory 
in order to remain relevant. If they do not, individuals will engage in alternative 
memoralisation that threatens to overturn the official narrative. There is therefore a strong 
tug-of-war between the need to present a narrative of national unity and the requirement that 
memory be presented in a way that is meaningful to those who do the work of remembering. 
Ultimately, these contradictions cannot be resolved. But this raises the question: how can the 
core of nationalism be linked to a compelling, inclusive image of a sovereign community of 
equal members if the individual memories of that community are not given equal status? 
Of course, this is simply one case study. Indeed, it is a case study of nationalism in a 
country that does not claim to be liberal. The assertions made in this chapter are not strong 
enough to refute completely the possibility of an inclusive nationalism. For that reason, in the 
following chapter I will continue to explore these themes in a country which does position 




Chapter 3: ANZAC Day in Australia 
 
In March 2011, the National Commission on the Commemoration of the Anzac Centenary 
published a report for government consideration entitled How Australia may commemorate 
the Anzac Centenary. As the title suggests, the report provided recommendations regarding 
the best ways to commemorate the centenary of the landing of Anzac troops at Gallipoli on 
25 April 1915. This day—Anzac Day—had long been an important date in the 
commemorative calendar of the Australian state. In the words of the Australian War 
Memorial, Anzac Day is ‘the day on which we remember all Australians who served and died 
in war and on operational service past and present’.128 However, it also serves as an unofficial 
national day of Australia. Conservative commentator Andrew Bolt describes the day as ‘the 
most important day in our calendar for reminding ourselves that we are one people, joined by 
a love of this country’.129 Indeed, the National Commission’s report noted that ‘the Anzac 
tradition has undeniably shaped the development of Australia since the First World War’.130 
However, it also suggested that the focus on Australia’s military history was ‘something of a 
double-edged sword’. It noted that, while the centenary might provide opportunities for a 
sense of national unity, it might also become a ‘potential area of divisiveness’. Anzac Day 
commemorations should therefore be ‘culturally sensitive and inclusive’ so as to not alienate 
Australia’s many ethnic communities.  
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The report noted a potential issue with the commemorative day. As the de facto 
national day of modern, multi-cultural Australia, Anzac Day is expected to be inclusive and 
meaningful for all ‘Australians’. Yet, the story of Anzac Day has historically focused on the 
experiences of Anglo-Celtic men in a way that excludes the memories of the country’s other 
ethnic groups. In response, there have been a number of arguments in public discourse about 
the best ways to interpret the Anzac legend. Some groups have tried to raise awareness about 
the service at Gallipoli of minority groups, such as Indigenous Australians, Italian-
Australians, and even Chinese-Australians.131 Others have tried to reframe the message of 
Anzac Day so that it focuses on certain ‘Australian values’. On the other hand, some insist 
that Australia’s ‘core culture’ is based on an Anglo-Celtic heritage which the Anzac story 
should reflect.132 These different interpretations are often in conflict with one another. None 
are hegemonic. In this context, the national story of the Anzacs as presented on 25 April has 
become a tapestry of contested narratives. However, all have in common the idea that there is 
an ‘Australian Anzac story’ which can, and should, be used to represent ‘us’.  
The following chapter will explore the narrative conflicts between these interacting 
strands as they discuss what is appropriate and what is inappropriate to commemorate on 25 
April. I will begin with a discussion of theory regarding interpretative communities and 
narrative plot structures. I will then turn to a brief discussion regarding the development of 
the ‘Anzac story’ and its historical negotiation and renegotiation in the face of contestation 
regarding its meaning. This will be followed by an analysis of several recent Anzac Day 
controversies and the conflicts between interpretive communities that arose in their wake. I 
will conclude with an analysis that explains the difficulties in creating an inclusive national 
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story in the face of these contested narratives. In so doing, I hope to explore the potential for 
nationalism to be divorced from the language of exclusion and ethnic divisions and be used 
instead to defend concepts of individual civil liberties and democracy in the Australian 
context. 
 
Anzac Day in public memory discourse and narrative emplotment 
The foundation of Anzac Day is the so-called ‘Anzac Legend’. This is a story about the 
historical experiences and character of the members of the Australian armed forces from the 
landings at Gallipoli in 1915 to the present day. However, the Anzac legend is more than just 
a dry repetition of the events of the past. It is an emotional narrative that claims to incorporate 
personal and collective identities, individual and national memories, and academic and 
popular history. Each of these components shape each other and influence the ways in which 
individuals interpret the Anzac legend. As a result, there are a several different versions of 
the Anzac legend which influence the way certain groups regard Anzac Day. 
 The Anzac Legend is a story and, like all stories, it cannot encompass all events and 
viewpoints. ‘The idea of an exhaustive narrative’, as Ricœur points out, ‘is a performatively 
impossible idea.’133 If one were to incorporate all the events of the past into a story, the story 
would be impossibly long and, in many places, irrelevant or even incoherent. All narratives, 
therefore, are selective. As Khoury points out, historical narratives in particular consciously 
‘select, organise, and prioritise events taken from the raw, unprocessed and potentially 
endless list of past and present events’ in order to make sense of them.134 The process of 
ignoring perspectives and events is therefore an essential element in the telling of narratives. 
As Roland Barthes says, all the ‘static’ is cut out, and every event is carefully crafted to 
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further the plot or the character development.135 Therefore, according to Ernst Renan, the 
process of ‘forgetting’ is as important as the process of remembering in the construction of a 
national narrative.136  
 Being a historical narrative, the Anzac legend must make reference to the memories 
of the national collective. However, collective memory is simultaneously a reflection of, and 
reflected by, collective identity. Identities, whether personal, collective, or national, are 
narrative constructions. They need to be mentally conceived by individuals who construct 
that identity as a part of their past in a narrative format. An individual who cannot remember, 
cannot construct an identity of themselves. This has been suggested as one of the reasons 
dementia patients begin to lose their personality as their memories deteriorate.137 As John 
Gillis explains: ‘The core meaning of any individual or group identity [is] … a sense of 
sameness over time [and this] is sustained by remembering.’138 Gillis goes on to explain that 
‘what is remembered is defined by the assumed identity’. What he means by this is that 
present identity and past memories are mutually constitutive. Perceptions of oneself in the 
present shape how one remembers the past. But, similarly, what one chooses to remember 
about the past reinforces or reshapes one’s identity in the present. Collective identity depends 
on narratives based on commonality, shared experiences, and shared memories. These 
collective memories must be maintained by individuals who are obliged to do the 
remembering,139 but the memories of those individuals are moulded to fit the collective 
narrative. Thus, the events remembered in historical narratives like the Anzac Legend are 
often shaped by the identities of individuals in the present.  
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The experiences of individuals within a collective group are shaped by a common 
interpretive code. Two important parts of this code are the Script and the Schema. The script 
is composed of the existing preconceptions and opinions on certain issues. The schema is the 
wider temporal narrative in which individuals place their personal memories.140 These two 
elements combine to highlight specific events in an individual’s memory and to imbue them 
with themes. For instance, the script may promote the idea that a certain ethnic group is 
mistreated due to racism, which would sensitise individual members of that group to 
experiences of discrimination. Meanwhile, the schema could be a broader narrative which 
provides context for the individual’s experiences of racism.141 The script and schema have 
significant power over collective memory, and therefore collective identity, but they are not 
always an accurate reflection of historical events. Indeed, they rely heavily on the selective 
interpretation of a small number of events in their creation.  
Personal memories, therefore, can be modified in order to conform to the script, 
schema, and selectivity of the collective narrative. Brewer et al. argue that a need for social 
acceptance causes the ‘self-stereotyping’ of identity, that is, the suppression of all individual 
traits and the attendant cultivation of socially approved ones.142 Moreover, ‘the individual’s 
own mental processes are transformed as the inter-psychological processes and meditational 
tools are internalized’,143 so it is altogether more probable that individuals will produce 
memories that are highly compatible with the collective memory. This can certainly be seen 
in the construction of the Anzac myth over the years. In his study of Australian First World 
War veterans, Alistair Thomson notes that demobilised Anzac soldiers often suppressed 
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personal memories that did not conform to the dominant patriotic discourse in the post-war 
period.144 I will explore this phenomenon to a greater degree below, but for now it is worth 
bearing in mind that, because people are socially constituted, they are predisposed to 
adopting the dominant memory of the society in which they live. Thus, individuals will 
remember specific events in their lives which mimic the wider act of selection in ‘national 
history’. 
 The wider process of historical selectivity, and the personal viewing of the world 
through an interpretative code, leads to the establishment of plot structures which are applied 
to broader history. Hayden White refers to this process as emplotment—the process by which 
the unprocessed historical dots are connected into an analytical narrative.145 White argued 
that there are four basic plot structures which historians apply to the historical record in order 
to explain the past. Building on literary critic Northrop Frye’s categorisations, White declared 
that these four essential plot structures were romantic, tragic, comic, and satiric. One should 
note that these plot-structures are ideal types and are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The 
different plot structures can be combined in some cases. At the time, White applied these 
literary tropes specifically to the work of historians, and as such his theory was controversial. 
However, it should be less controversial to apply White’s theory to public narratives of the 
past. After all, public narratives tend to be less concerned with historical accuracy than the 
construction of a workable historical narrative with a unifying script and schema to convey 
moral, or national themes.  
In the words of Hayden White, the romantic plot is ‘a drama of self-identification 
symbolised by the hero’s transcendence of the world of experience, his victory over it, and 
his final liberation from it. … It is the drama of the triumph of good over evil, of virtue over 
 
144 Alistair Thomson, Anzac Memories: Living with the legend, (Clayton: Monash University Publishing, 2013)  
145 Hayden White, Metahistory: the historical imagination in nineteenth-century Europe, (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1973), 3. 
49 
 
vice, of light over darkness, and of the ultimate transcendence of man over the world in 
which he was imprisoned by the Fall.’146 From start to finish, the romantic plot is a story of 
progress. The protagonist might go through periods of difficulty. However, these dark periods 
are rarely of the hero’s own making, but instead they are usually forced on them by some 
insidious outside force. Ultimately, however, the hero will triumph and, at the end of the 
narrative arc, they will be in a better position than when they started their journey.  
The romantic plot is the structure of choice for most national narratives. This is 
because the romantic plot represents an ethos that is directed at national unity and heroism. 
To tell the past in a way that does not conform to the romantic plot would, as memory scholar 
James E. Young states, ‘undermine the very foundations of national legitimacy, of the state’s 
seemingly natural right to exist’.147 The romantic plot structure, therefore, helps order a 
national narrative in a way such that the perspectives of victims are forgotten. When 
victimhood is raised in a romantic narrative, it is always the protagonist who has suffered 
some injustice. The romantic plot is the plot structure of more conservative interpretations of 
Anzac Day. This plot focuses on the heroism of the Australian armed forces and actively 
ignores the suffering of Aboriginal peoples or the war crimes committed by the soldiers of 
the Australian Imperial Force (AIF). This emplotment strategy is a powerful tool in the 
construction of national identity, but poor at acknowledging dark pages of the past. 
The tragic plot is thematically opposed to the romantic plot. Tragic plots begin as a 
story of progress, but end in regression. High ideals expressed during the inaugural moment 
crumble under pressure and humanity is forced to learn to live with limitations. ‘Tragedy has 
no festive occasions’, White writes, ‘except false or illusionary ones.’148 The divisions and 
conflicts between the characters of the narrative are often more terrible than the conflict 
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which initiated the drama. Tragic plots also typically include a moment during which the 
protagonist recognises his or her crimes and failings, and becomes aware of his status as a 
tragic hero. From this point there can be no return to glory. In almost all cases, therefore, the 
tragic plot is antithetical to the national narrative. The tragic plot not only recognises the 
victimisation of others, it recognises the internal self-failings that led to it. A tragic plot is 
inherently self-doubting and self-critical, and thus makes a poor choice for a national 
narrative that aims to unite. Indeed, it is far more common to see one group accuse another of 
wanting to transform the national narrative into a tragic plot, than it is to see that tragic plot in 
action.  
The comic plot takes the opposite trajectory from the tragic plot. Where tragedy 
moves from progressive to regressive, comedy travels from regressive to progressive.149 The 
comedic plot begins with the moral and material failures of the hero. As in a tragic plot, there 
is a moment when the hero recognises his past failings. Unlike in a tragic plot, however, the 
hero reforms and begins his return to glory. A comic plot, at a certain level, recognises that 
no hero is perfect. All humans are vulnerable to wrong-doing, but, at the same time, no 
human is absolutely evil, just as they are also never absolutely good. The comic plot is often 
used in national narrative to incorporate previously forgotten or mistreated national groups. 
Consider the following passage by Indigenous Australian journalist Stan Grant: 
 
As Indigenous people we mark these solemn moments with our own memories … 
They are the memories of people who served and fought but came home to a still 
segregated land. I think of those black diggers and their white comrades. I think of 
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their sacrifice and the mateship they forged. And I see the better Australia they fought 
for.150 
 
Grant’s narrative attempts to incorporate the experiences of Indigenous Australian 
soldiers who have traditionally been neglected in the Anzac narrative. However, Grant does 
not shy away from the past failings of the Australian nation. Indeed, he draws attention to the 
fact that Australia was a segregated and unjust society in the 1910s. But he balances it by 
referencing comradery between black and white diggers and by envisioning a better 
present/future. Comic plots often argue for compromise between divergent groups in this 
way. 
The satiric plot is one in which there is little deeper meaning in history beyond the 
fact, as White puts it, that ‘man is ultimately a captive of the world rather than its master’.151 
Satire, therefore, is characterised by a lack of agency. The protagonists of a satiric plot are 
dominated by the forces of nature and the powers of destiny. While the protagonists may 
attempt to change the overall trajectory of the story, the reality is that greater forces beyond 
their control will determine the outcome. One common feature of the satiric plot is the use of 
the passive voice, which conceals the active agents. Khoury demonstrates this by using an 
example from a 1960s German textbook in which the outbreak of World War One is 
explained: 
 
The war between Germany and France followed inevitably from the conflict with 
Russia. France was bound by its alliance with Russia, and Germany by its treaty with 
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Austria. (…) The entanglement of European alliances is what led to the conflict 
between Germany and France.152 
 
The satiric plot can be used in national narratives to imply a lack of responsibility. 
This in turn can be used to justify crimes of the past and make events seem inevitable. For 
instance, in the example above, the German government’s active decision to go to war in 
1914 can be overlooked and thus their role in the outbreak of war downplayed. However, it 
can also be used to reconcile two competing narratives. In this example, despite the fact that 
they were on opposite sides, neither the French nor Germany governments are blamed for the 
outbreak of war. Instead, both are portrayed as having been forced into it by similar external 
factors. 
 As I have already suggested, however, not all social groups interpret the Anzac legend 
in the same way. Sometimes different groups will select different events to commemorate or 
they will ascribe different plot structures to the same sequence of events. Reader-response 
theory explains this by arguing that different people can interpret the same narratives 
differently due to ambiguities in the text. What we think a text is saying is actually a result of 
our own interpretations as we actively fill in those ambiguities. In the words of Stanley Fish, 
we are writing the text as we read it.153 As a result, narrative meaning is different for different 
people. However, people do not have entirely unique readings of a text. Instead, they 
naturally fall into camps with other people who have come to the same conclusion. Fish 
called these camps, ‘interpretive communities’, which are ‘made up of those who share 
interpretive strategies not for reading … but for writing a text, for constituting their properties 
and assigning their intentions’.154 An interpretive community is predisposed to come to the 
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same conclusions about a text because they have used the same methods to analyse it. This 
bears some similarity to Duncan Bell’s concept of mythscapes. For the members of a 
particular interpretive community, challenges to their group’s plot structure are perceived as 
being factually wrong. This makes them an existential threat to the identity which they have 
built around their chosen narrative plot structure. Getting divergent interpretive communities 
to find common ground is immensely difficult as they have built the narrative around 
different interpretive techniques.  
 
The Dominant Anzac Narrative 
While there are many different interpretations of the Anzac Legend in Australia, there is an 
official narrative. This narrative has always held a strong influence over the commemorative 
culture of Australia. Having said this, the exact meaning of the narrative has changed over 
time. Yet, it has always maintained a core mythology about the actions and character of the 
Anzac soldiers in 1915. These interpretations are not always based on fact, but rather 
specifically moulded memories. What is clear is that this narrative is largely romantic in plot 
structure and strongly influences the present public discourse on Anzac Day 
The members of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) who fought at Gallipoli were a 
diverse group of people. They ranged from thugs, gamblers and heavy drinkers, to poets and 
teetotallers. Some were motivated by religious or patriotic impulses, while others were crude 
and cynical.155 The soldiers came from many different backgrounds. For instance, a 
significant minority had been born in Britain. Over one third of the enlisted men had 
emigrated to Australia from Great Britain in the preceding decades before World War I.156 
Indigenous Australian people were present at Gallipoli, despite the fact that the Australian 
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government did not recognise them as proper citizens.157 The soldiers came both from rural 
and urban backgrounds, although those from the city far outnumbered those from the bush.158 
The soldiers served in a wide variety of roles and thus their experience of the war varied 
considerably. Many fought directly on the frontlines as privates and non-commissioned 
officers in the infantry. Others acted as officers, or as support staff. Women, too, experienced 
the war at Gallipoli, for instance as nurses on hospital ships.159  
These people joined the War for a variety of different motives. Some enlisted out of a 
desire for adventure, others due to a sense of patriotism or imperial loyalty, more simply out 
of peer pressure or because their friends had been recruited.160 Their experiences and 
opinions differed after the war as well. Many did not return at all. Of those who did, a large 
number were deeply traumatised by their experiences and became pacifists in later life. On 
the other hand, a small minority came to despise civil society and joined paramilitary or 
fascist organisations like the ‘New Guard’, led by Lieutenant Colonel Eric Campbell.161 
There was no standard ‘Australian’ who went to war in 1915. The war experiences, personal 
character, and later impact on life was diverse. Yet, despite this reality, the Australian 
narrative of war has often been subsumed into a governing narrative which homogenises the 
experiences of those involved.  
Almost immediately after the landing of AIF troops at Gallipoli, the Australian war 
experience was narrativized in the form of the Anzac legend. This narrative emphasised 
Australian martial superiority, mateship, loyalty, physical courage, masculinity, and so 
forth.162 The two men most responsible for the initiation of this legend were Ellis Ashmead-
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Bartlett and Charles E.W. Bean. On 8 May 1915, an article by Ashmead-Bartlett appeared in 
the Sydney Morning Herald, in which he described the Australian soldiers as natural 
combatants. He reported that, during the landings at Gallipoli: ‘The Australians rose to the 
occasion. Not waiting for orders or for the boats to reach the beach, they sprang into the sea 
… then this race of athletes proceeded to scale the cliffs.’163 As one cynical commentator 
remarked, Ashmead-Bartlett’s eyesight ‘must have been brilliant’ as, during the landings, he 
had been aboard a battleship out at sea.164 However, Ashmead-Bartlett’s writings set the tone 
for the subsequent reporting of the Anzac exploits.  
Charles E.W. Bean, the official war correspondent to the Australian Imperial Force, 
developed a legend of Australian exceptionalism in the same heroic vein as Ashmead-
Bartlett. Bean wanted to demonstrate how ‘the Australian people—and the Australian 
character, if there is one—come through the universally recognised test of this, their first 
great war’.165 In 1916, he published the so-called Anzac Book, in which incorporated 
contributions from Australian Anzac soldiers. However, The Anzac Book was Bean’s own 
creation, and he strove to present the Australian soldiers within the framework of his own 
personal vision. According to Kevin Fewster: ‘The characteristic [Bean] perceived in the 
soldiers tallied with that which had so impressed him in earlier years with the men of the 
outback.’166 Indeed, after only a few days at Gallipoli, Bean was writing that ‘the wild 
pastoral life of Australia, if it makes rather wild men, makes superb soldiers’.167 His assertion 
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is difficult to reconcile with the fact that, in 1915, only 17 percent of the AIF had been bush 
workers before the war.168 
Therefore, for Bean’s image of the Anzac soldier as a ‘bushman in disguise’ to 
persist, a great deal of information had to be supressed or excluded from the narrative. The 
contributions from soldiers that Bean deployed in his book were both limited and extensively 
censored. Only 150 responses from a force of 36,000 – 41,000 Australian soldiers were 
recorded and, even then, Bean excluded those which did not fit his vision. In the words of E. 
M. Andrews: ‘Pieces which illustrated the grim reality of war, or mentioned cowardice, 
malingering, longing for beer, bitterness at officers or cynicism were rigorously excluded.’169 
Bean also had to deal with the fact that the Gallipoli campaign had ended in a military defeat 
for the Australian troops. This fact made claims of Australian martial superiority relatively 
disingenuous. As such, Bean wrote the narrative so that Australia’s triumph lay in: 
 
the mettle of the men themselves. To be the sort of man who would give way when 
his mates were trusting to his firmness … to live the rest of his life haunted by the 
knowledge that he had set his hand to a soldier’s task and had lacked the grit to carry 
it through—that was the prospect which these men could not face. Life was very dear, 
but life was not worth living unless they could be true to their idea of Australian 
manhood.170 
 
Although Bean’s narrative was highly selective, it became the foundation of the 
Anzac legend that was presented to the Australian public during early Anzac 
commemorations in the 1920s. By 1927, all the Australian states observed some form of 
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public holiday on Anzac Day. These commemorations invariably glorified the deeds of the 
Australian soldiers who were increasingly being established as the pride of Australia. The 
glorification of these soldiers continued in the interwar years, aided in no small part by the 
veterans themselves through the Returned Sailors and Soldier’s Imperial League of Australia 
(RSSILA), as well as by politicians, right-wing ‘patriots’, and bereaved relatives who sought 
comfort in the Anzac myth.171  
The legend, however, was based on a limited understanding of the Anzac experience. 
Its plot structure was fundamentally romantic in that it focused on the heroism of the Anzac 
soldiers to the exclusion of all else. The official narrative that dominated public discourse in 
the interwar period excluded those who did not fit the narrative of Anzac as presented in 
Bean’s The Anzac Book.172 Indigenous soldiers, women, and those who served behind the 
lines, were forgotten. Also removed were the Australian officers who, being responsible for 
several military blunders, did not fit Bean’s narrative of superior Australian military 
capabilities.173  
As a result, many individual soldiers became critical of, and cynical about, their status 
as Anzac heroes. Their individual experiences of war simply did not match up with the 
narrative of the state. Others had become pacifists due to their war experiences and used 
Anzac Day as an occasion for grief rather than as a celebration of Australian manhood. As 
Marilyn Lake and Carina Donaldson point out, some returned soldiers ‘felt neither adequately 
compensated nor at all consoled by Anzac mythology’.174  
 The mythology and symbolism of the Anzac legend was deeply embedded into 
Australian social and cultural life following the interwar period. In 1941 the Australian War 
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Memorial was unveiled in Canberra. Planned by Charles Bean, the Memorial was designed to 
ritually honour returned servicemen and memorialise the dead and missing. The Memorial 
served as the heart of the Anzac legend. Children were exposed to stories of Anzac and were, 
in the words of Martin Crotty and Craig Stockings, ‘visited by veterans and regaled with 
stories of Australian martial valour’.175 Even the word “Anzac” itself became legally 
protected by the War Precautions and Protection of the Word Anzac Act of 1920.176 There 
were challenges to the Anzac legend, in particular from pacifists, peace activists, historians, 
feminists, disenchanted veterans and others (particularly during the Vietnam War).177 Yet it 
was continually championed by veterans’ associations and, though it sometimes waned in 
prominence, it never disappeared. While Anzac Day held significance for Australian national 
identity during this time, it remained largely a day for war commemoration. 
 In the 1990s, however, Anzac Day was reinvented as a day of national celebration in 
addition to a day of mourning. Mark McKenna argues that this was due to the need for a new 
national day in light of increasing Australian nationalism and the decreasing popularity of 
Australia Day.178 But, in order to become a national day, the official meaning of the Anzac 
Legend had to both more inclusive and more ‘Australian’. Before this, in the words of Frank 
Bongiorno, ‘when Anzac was a less inclusive tradition, those who were most responsible for 
policing its boundaries and regulating its rituals essentially courted—and often received—
criticism from other citizens and groups.’179 In order to avoid the divisions that plagued 
Australia Day, the Anzac Legend had to appeal to the many diverse cultures which had 
developed in Australia following the waves of post-World War II immigration. The old 
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custodians of the Anzac tradition (like the RSL) were increasing displaced by the Department 
of Veterans Affairs and the Australian War Memorial. For new migrants, by ‘the 1990s these 
groups [which had previously been excluded from the narrative] accepted Anzac Day’s 
renewed prominence as a national day and wanted to prove their Australianness through 
claiming a part of the Anzac legend.’180 Indeed, in 1974, in Canberra, the Anzac Day march 
was led by Vietnam veterans, women, and immigrants, including Turkish immigrants, whose 
ancestors had fought on the opposite side.181 The imperial character of Anzac Day, which had 
been prominent in earlier commemorations, was stripped as nationalist republican sentiments 
strengthened in public discourse. The 1981 film Gallipoli presented the war as a coming of 
age moment for the Australian nation. The film also presented an adversarial relationship 
between the Australian soldiers and the British high command. In Gallipoli the Anzacs were 
seen to be ‘victims’ of British incompetence and arrogance. At the same time, those 
Australian officers who had been excluded from the legend in Bean’s narrative were now 
reintroduced as inept and disdainful English officers instead.  
During the premiership of John Howard in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Anzac Day 
exploded in popularity. During his first Anzac Day as Prime Minister, Howard identified 
Anzac Day as the focal point of a new and more traditional nationalism.  
 
It is particularly gratifying that some vestige of cynicism over Anzac Day a 
generation ago appears to have evaporated with young Australians taking more 
interest than ever before in Anzac Day and what it means for our national identity.182 
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According to several scholars, including historians Mark McKenna and Romain Fathi, 
Anzac Day served to help Howard divert attention from the history of Aboriginal 
dispossession and frontier massacres.183 By reframing the origin story of Australian history to 
the Gallipoli landings, Anzac Day could serve as the focal point of a celebratory national 
narrative in place of Australia Day. The Australian national story could now focus on the 
sacrifice and service of the Australian soldiers and their role in shaping the nation. By 
bringing the origin of the Australian nation forward 100 years, generations of Indigenous 
dispossession could be cut from the story. The central role of frontier violence and 
discrimination in the establishment of Australia as a nation could be safely ignored. This 
allowed for the inclusion of Indigenous Australian peoples into the Anzac legend as equal 
members of the national community. Memorials and services were established to emphasis 
this. For instance, in 1993, in Canberra, a memorial was established to remember “the 
Aboriginal people who served in the Australian forces".184 The Anzac legend now 
emphasised unity by focus on the sacrifice and service of all Australian soldiers, regardless of 
their ethnic background. Thus, Anzac Day could represent the experiences of Indigenous 
people while ignoring their hardships in a settler society. Through this act of selectivity, the 
official narrative could retain a romantic plot structure that focused on heroism rather than 
exploring internal self-failings. 
  There is no question that the Anzac legend has become more inclusive ever since the 
1980s. In the 2000s, growing awareness of the involvement of the ‘black diggers’ at Gallipoli 
has led to greater inclusion of Indigenous Australians on Anzac Day.185 The ABC television 
series ANZAC Girls, which aired in 2014, was part of a wider trend that restored the 
experiences of women in the war. The Anzac Spirit is now said to be ‘more to do with 
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mateship and sacrifice than conquest and power … bloodlust was not the mark of the 
Anzacs.’186 This is in stark contrast to Ashmead-Bartlett’s description of the AIF forces as 
soldiers ‘whose blood was up … rushing northwards and eastwards, searching for fresh 
enemies to bayonet’.187 Yet, the official narrative remains focused on the Anzacs of Gallipoli 
in 1915. Perhaps in response to this, certain sectors of society have developed their version of 
Australian identity around their understanding of the Anzac legend. This has led to conflict 
when alternative interpretations call aspects of the Anzac legend into question or attempt to 
broaden the Anzac narrative to incorporate additional material. These conflicts will be 
explored in the section below.  
 
Anzac Day Controversies 
While Australian politicians claim to embrace a multicultural and civic nationalism, 
controversies still arise on Anzac Day when certain individuals or groups engage with the 
history of Anzac in specific ways. These groups still believe that there is an ‘Australian story’ 
and are genuinely attempting to express their identity within an ‘Australian’ narrative. But, in 
order to do so, these individuals or groups introduce new material to the Anzac story which 
undermine the assumptions or the plot structures of certain other interpretive communities. 
This sometimes results in quite vocal backlashes from certain sections of the population, such 
as conservative politicians or right-wing radio-provocateurs. Thus, what we see in the public 
discourse is a variety of narrative strands interacting with one another as they debate the 
Australian story. No one strand is hegemonic, but some voices are more strident and 
aggressive than others, and seem to dominate public discourse.  
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On Anzac Day 2017, for example, outspoken Sudanese-Australian activist Yassmin 
Abdel-Magied posted the words ‘LEST.WE.FORGET. (Manus, Nauru, Syria, Palestine…)’ 
on her personal Facebook page.188 The words in parentheses referenced the plight of refugees 
held by the Australian government in detention on Manus Island and Nauru, as well as the 
suffering of those caught up in the Syrian Civil War and the various injustices suffered by 
Palestinians. Shortly after posting these words, Abdel-Magied deleted the section in 
parentheses and posted an apology which read: ‘It was brought to my attention that my last 
post was disrespectful, and for that, I apologise unreservedly.’ However, the damage was 
done, and what followed was a veritable storm of criticism levelled at Abdel-Magied. The 
criticisms came from many quarters of society, including journalists, conservative 
commentators, politicians, and the general public via social media and letters to the editor. 
The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), one of Abdel-Magied’s employers, 
distanced themselves from her comments. An ABC spokesman stated that ‘Ms Abdel-Magied 
is … engaged in a range of other activities and work that is not related to the ABC. Her views 
and opinions in that capacity are her own and do not represent those of the ABC.’189 One 
month later, the ABC cancelled the television program that Abdel-Magied hosted. An ABC 
spokeswoman argued that ‘This decision … was not to do with any controversy over 
presenter Yassmin Abdel-Magied’.190 Yet the Sydney Moring Herald claimed that, at a 
certain level, this decision was influence by Abdel-Magied’s Anzac Day comments. 191 
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This was not the first time a controversy of this nature had occurred on Anzac Day. In 
2015, Scott McIntyre, a sports reporter for the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), posted 
several comments via his twitter account late on Anzac Day. The tweets read: 
 
• The cultification of an imperialist invasion of a foreign nation that Australia had no 
quarrel with is against all ideals of modern society. 
• Wonder if the poorly-read, largely white, nationalist drinkers and gamblers pause 
today to consider the horror that all mankind suffered. 
• Remembering the summary execution, widespread rape and theft committed by these 
‘brave’ Anzacs in Egypt, Palestine and Japan. 
• Not forgetting that the largest single-day terrorist attacks in history were committed 
by this nation & their allies in Hiroshima & Nagasaki.192 
McIntyre’s comments were described by the SBS as ‘highly inappropriate and disrespectful’ 
and he was subsequently fired. Malcolm Turnbull, the Communications Minister at the time, 
responded on Twitter and called McIntyre’s comments ‘Despicable remarks which deserve to 
be condemned.’193 Some did try to defend McIntyre. Several reporters, including Channel 
Ten’s Hugh Riminton, Fairfax Media’s Geoff Winestock and the Sydney Morning Herald’s 
Dominic Bossi, pointed out that McIntyre was within his rights to criticise Anzac Day via his 
personal Twitter account.194 Afterall, in Riminton’s words, ‘Our Diggers also died for free 
speech’.195 However, these opinions were shot down. Conservative commentator Chris 
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Kenny took aim at them through an article in the Advertiser in which he wrote: ‘Apparently 
they think it’s OK for someone … to erroneously insult the public, smear our heritage, 
slander our forebears, demean the nation and offend anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of 
history or national values.’196  
Compared to McIntyre’s comments, Abdel-Magied’s Facebook post was mild. She 
did not criticise Australian soldiers, past or present. Nor did she denigrate those who attended 
Anzac commemorations in the way MacIntyre did. Yet, the reaction to Abdel-Magied’s 
comments was either comparable to, or far outstripped, the reaction to McIntyre’s. 
Particularly online, many people seemed to take offence and posted comments indicating 
their displeasure. By the end of 2017, Abdel-Magied’s ‘Lest.We.Forget’ post had 
approximately 9,700 comments. Some of these simply expressed annoyance that Abdel-
Magied was being ‘so shameful and disrespectful’ on the day ‘over 100 years ago that many 
people died to make this country safe for you to … freely express an opinion’. Other 
comments had xenophobic undertones, such as one which stated ‘More reason not to let 
people like her to live in Western, civilised country!’ Admittedly not all comments were 
negative. However, in a sample of 100 responses to Abdel-Magied’s apology message, nearly 
36% of comments were negative while only 22% of comments were supportive. Shortly after 
Abdel-Magied posted her Facebook comment, a Change.Org petition was established which 
had the stated aim of encouraging the ‘ABC to fire Yassmin Abdel-Magied over disgusting 
ANZAC Day posts’.197 By the time the petition closed it had been signed by over 48,000 
people. In the comments section, supporters posted their motives for signing. These 
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by bringing into play refugees or refugees by choice,’ and ‘Im Australian & want all other 
Australians … made here or imported to embrace & live within OUR laws & OUR cultural 
beliefs.’  
As in the McIntyre case, politicians, especially those from right-wing and 
conservative parties, joined the public outcry. Unsurprisingly, Pauline Hanson, leader of the 
nationalist, anti-immigration One Nation Party, took aim at Abdel-Magied, and declared that 
she was ‘disgusted to hear about Yassmin Abdel-Magied’s comments’. According to Hanson: 
‘Yesterday means so much to all Australians. She has no understanding, no idea.’198 
Hanson’s statement that Abdel-Magied has no understanding about a day that means ‘so 
much to all Australians’ implies that Abdel-Magied is not a true Australian. This is a 
common ethnic nationalist position which links respect for cultural practices to national 
belonging and was hardly surprising coming from the leader of One Nation. However, 
ministers from the right-wing ruling Liberal-National Coalition joined the attack. 
Immigration Minister Peter Dutton stated: ‘It is a disgrace that on our most significant 
national day … this advocate seeks to make political mileage’.199 The then Acting Prime 
Minister Barnaby Joyce supported calls for the ABC to take action against Abdel-Magied. 
Although not as overt as Hanson, Joyce made a similar appeal to national culture, stating that 
the ‘ABC is, in some instances, at odds with the culture of Australia’.200 On the other hand, 
former Prime Minister Tony Abbott was much more explicit when, in response to a question 
about Abdel-Magied, he argued that ‘you’ve got to join Team Australia, you’ve got to accept 
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our core culture, you’ve got to accept our fundamental values’.201 The response from the left-
wing of Australian politics was muted, but still present. Bill Shorten, leader of the Australian 
Labor Party said that the comments were ‘very insensitive’ but that she should not lose her 
position with the ABC.202  
The commercial media helped to fuel the outrage. Often these attacks on Abdel-
Magied were linked to wider political points. The Daily Telegraph devoted most of its front 
page to the controversy. ‘Two Finger Salute’ the headline screamed, with the line over it, 
‘ABC host’s ultimate insult to Anzac legend.’ The line under the heading read: ‘Un-
Australian Broadcasting Corporation backs activist who demeans our war heroes.’203 These 
explicit attacks against the ABC through Abdel-Magied were a major part of the media’s 
criticism. One-time Labor minister turned political commentator for Sky News Live Graham 
Richardson, appeared on a wide variety of radio shows and podcasts. On the Bolt Report, 
Richardson spoke with Andrew Bolt and complained that the ‘ABC must do something about 
[Abdel-Magied] sooner or later’ and that ‘at some point, because they are Australians at the 
ABC … it’s gotta start to act like it.’204 To the ‘George and Paul’ podcast, Richardson argued 
that ‘this has hit Australia at its core’ and that he had ‘rarely seen the nation come together as 
one to condemn someone. Everyone’s condemning her except … the ABC’.205 Richardson 
was selective in his own personal narrative here. He conveniently ignored the fact that 
criticisms of Abdel-Magied were not in fact universal, and that the Australian Greens, the 
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Guardian Australia, the Griffith Review magazine, and several academics, had all defended 
her. Regardless, Richardson’s point—that the ABC had failed to live up to ‘Australian 
values’ by failing to condemn someone who had attacked a sacred day—was taken up by 
others. Andrew Bolt argued that ‘Anzac Day is perhaps the last remaining national day when 
we take pride in our past and honour what we hope are our finest qualities’, while also 
arguing that it was being ‘white-anted and drowned in guilt by our schools and the ABC.’206  
The response to Abdel-Magied comparatively innocuous comments from some 
politicians, the commercial media, and sections of the general public seems like a massive 
over-reaction. However, it makes some sense if viewed as a product of nationalist collective 
narcissism. Narcissists are individuals with an inflated sense of personal superiority and 
entitlement. Yet, narcissists are dependent on continuous external validation and they respond 
with anger or aggression to any perceived personal insult, criticism, or humiliation.207 The 
concept of collective narcissism takes these characteristics of personal narcissism and applies 
them on a group level.208 The emotional investment in an unrealistic belief about in-group 
greatness leads, as Golec de Zavala et al suggests, to hostility against those ‘who insult or 
criticise their in-group.’209 The trouble is that collective narcissists see insult where others do 
not. For instance, in a study by Golec de Zavala et al, a transgression as petty as a joke made 
by a celebrity about the government of a country was enough for collective narcissists to 
advocate physical punishment against the ‘offender’.210 The reaction to Abdel-Magied’s 
comments somewhat fits these conditions. The petition designed to encourage the ABC to 
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fire Abdel-Magied was clearly predicated on the belief that she should be punished for 
expressing her views. In the words of one petition signatory, she should be fired for having 
‘absolutely no respect whatsoever in a country that nurtures and supports her.’ Although 
collective narcissism goes some way towards explain the extreme reaction to Abdel-Magied’s 
comments, it does not engage with the question as to why these particular comments were 
conceived as being insulting. 
Those who defended Abdel-Magied tended to argue that she was unfairly attacked 
because of her identification as an Islamic woman. Jane Gilmore wrote an opinion piece for 
the Sydney Morning Herald two days after the controversy with the title ‘Hysteria over 
Yassmin Abdel-Magied’s Anzac Day post cannot be separated from racism’.211 Gilmore 
pointed out that Abdel-Magied was hardly the only person to post a comment calling for us to 
‘remember, in addition to past lives lost, the people fleeing, dying and lost in wars being 
fought today’. Gilmore then listed several white, male news-reporters who had done the same 
without any comparable backlashing, such as Andrew P. Street, and Jeff Sparrow. She also 
pointed out that Indigenous Australian reporter Stan Grant had written an article on 26 April 
about the horrors experienced by Aboriginal soldiers in World War I without facing any 
backlash. Abdel-Magied also seemed to take this perspective. Her ‘crime’ he suggested was 
that she stopped trying to be a model migrant and ‘imagine[d] [she] was Australian enough to 
be able to criticise Australia or contribute to public discussion on [her] own terms.’212  
Abdel-Magied and her defenders probably have a point when one considers the 
volume of criticism levelled at her when compared with that aimed at McIntyre. Having said 
this, Abdel-Magied probably would not have been attacked had she had simply posted ‘lest 
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we forget’ or laid a wreath at a memorial. Furthermore, if it was simply a matter of identity, 
one has to question how Stan Grant was able to celebrate his identity as an Indigenous 
Australian through his piece on Australian Aboriginal soldiers without backlash. Abdel-
Magied’s identity, therefore, appears to have been an amplifier of criticism rather than a 
cause.  
 Abdel-Magied’s crime was that her post called into question a number of key 
assumptions at the core of her critic’s beliefs about the Anzac legend. Her comments 
included a number of implicit points that threatened the selectivity and emplotment of the 
Australian national narrative. For instance, she demonstrated the fact that, despite the efforts 
of the Australian armed forces past and present, asylum seekers and refugees continue to flee, 
individuals continue to suffer in war, and peace continues to elude us. Furthermore, her 
mention of Manus, Nauru, and Palestine appeared to suggest that, by failing to extend 
empathy or recognition to those who suffered due to war, Australia had in fact forgotten the 
horrors of war. These points fundamentally threaten the romantic notion of the Australian 
story held by a wide section of the population. They question the extent to which Australian 
armed intervention over the years has truly been an effective force for good. Such a 
politically charged comment was always going to cause controversy. However, by posting 
them on a day when some Australians centre their personal identity in a larger narrative of 
Australian progress, the comments were destined provoke mass feelings of personal insult.  
Similar controversies have arisen around the open memorialisation of Gay and 
Lesbian Australian Defence Force (ADF) members in Anzac commemorations. Around the 
same time as the Abdel-Magied controversy, conservative commentator Miranda Devine 
argued in the Daily Telegraph that the ‘ADF’s Defence Gay and Lesbian Information Service 
(DEFGLIS) … laid rainbow wreaths yesterday in an attempt to co-opt Anzac Day for the 
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LGBTI agenda.’213 Devine’s article reflected a long-standing hostility towards LGBTIQ 
commemorations, which could be traced back to the 1980s. Famously, on Anzac Day 1982, 
five members of the Gay Ex-Services Association (GESA) tried to lay a wreath at 
Melbourne’s Shrine of Remembrance. In so doing, according to Noah Riseman, GESA was 
attempting to position gays and lesbians as part of the wider Australian legend.214 Their 
attempt to lay the wreath was, at the time, prevented by the infamous President of the 
Victorian RSL, Bruce Ruxton. However, by the latter half of the 2010s the LGBTIQ 
community, led by DEFGALIS, had been afforded opportunities to commemorate past and 
present queer service people on Anzac Day. In other words, they had, within limits, been able 
to express their identity both as queer individuals and as members of the Australian Defence 
Force. There had been some backlash though. On Anzac Day in 2011, Christian lobbyist Jim 
Wallace tweeted: ‘Just hope that as we remember servicemen and women today we 
remember the Australia they fought for—wasn’t gay marriage and Islamic!’215 He later 
apologised for his comments and said that he had nothing against gay people or Muslims ‘but 
was making a statement about Australia’s Judeo Christian heritage’.216 Unlike the comments 
of Abdel-Magied, however, neither Devine’s nor Jim Wallace’s comments provoked a storm 
of criticism. Whether this implies tacit approval from those who so extensively criticised 
Abdel-Magied is impossible to say. However, the silence was noteworthy.  
 The criticism of queer involvement on Anzac Day tends to revolve around the 
assumption that LGBTIQ service people were not part of the initial Anzac experience. This 
can be seen in Ruxton’s opposition to GESA in 1982, when he stated: ‘I don’t know where all 
these queers and poofters have come from. I don’t remember a single poofter from World 
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War II’.217 Similarly, some thirty years later, in 2015, an online comment on Gay News 
Network read: ‘What if I was to drop a bombshell? There were no gay Anzacs lol. There 
weren’t any “homosexuals”, sodomy is a behaviour haha. Keep your fantasies in house and 
stop defaming the Australian Army’.218 Wallace’s claims also demonstrate a rejection of 
LGBTIQ involvement in the Australian war experience. By arguing that World War I 
Australian soldiers did not fight for gay-rights, he is implying that gay servicemen were 
either absent from the AIF or, if they were present, they did not aspire to improve their rights. 
These comments are demonstrative of the selectivity central to these controversies regarding 
national myth-making. Ruxton, Wallace and Devine, all reject the concept of LGBTIQ 
defence personnel as protagonists, or even beneficiaries, in the Australian Anzac story. Queer 
involvement, through the laying of wreaths and expressions of LGBTIQ identity, conflicts 
with Wallace’s and other’s perceived notions regarding the Anzac War experience.  
Part of the rejections of queer involvement may also come from the fact that queer 
identity threatens the dominant masculine interpretation of the Anzac soldier. Australian 
historian Noah Riseman and sociologists Katerina Agostino and Ben Wadham have argued 
that the Australian Defence Force has always been a hegemonic masculine institution.219 Its 
‘power structures, hierarchy, traditions, and culture favour expressions of martial masculinity 
over traits associated with femininity.’220 These hegemonic masculine values contained 
within the ADF are then ‘re-presented back to Australian Society on Anzac Day, in our 
history curricula and, in an overriding way, [shape] our versions of citizenship and national 
identity.’221 The presence of current and former service personnel who identify as queer 
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counters this masculine hierarchy. Gay men, in particular, confront stereotypes of what it 
means to be a ‘man’ and could therefore undermine the historical masculine construction of 
diggers in the Anzac Legend. The linking of national identity and sexual normativity in this 
way is well established in the discourse of nationalists. As George Mosse pointed out, fears 
about the existential threat posed by gay and lesbian identities to the martial strength of the 
nation has existed in some forms of nationalism since the nineteenth century.222 The open 
expression of queer identity on Anzac Day, therefore, threatens the underlying masculine 
narrative of the Anzac story as envisioned by Devine, Wallace, and those in their interpretive 
community. Open representation of LGBTIQ service personal on Anzac Day simply does not 
fit within their understanding of the history, meaning, or commemoration of the Anzac 
Legend.  
Finally, the commemoration of LGBTIQ service people can potentially challenge the 
romantic narrative of Anzac Day. Although DEFGALIS is very forward-looking and positive 
in its activism, LGBTIQ commemorations tend to contain an awareness of the past suffering 
and discrimination experienced by queer service people. The fact that queer service people, 
both in the past and in the present, have often felt the need to hide their sexuality, is seen as a 
tragedy. Indeed, many of the initiatives pushed by DEFGALIS aim to rectify this. This 
reality, however, is not entirely compatible with the assumptions of the romantic narrative. 
The assertion that the Australian Army has always been a force for good is tested when one 
considers its past tendency towards homophobia. Instead, LGBTIQ commemorations tend 
more towards a comedic narrative. In it, the failures of past governments with regards to 
queer service people are recognised, and as a result concrete steps are taken in the present to 
improve LGBTIQ rights. While this comedic narrative may be a suitable compromise for 
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some, for others, like Devine, the loss of the romantic narrative is abhorred. Thus, ‘an attempt 
to co-opt Anzac Day for the LGBTI agenda’ is perceived to be totally unacceptable. 
Expressions of Indigenous Australian identity on Anzac Day faced almost identical 
criticism to that experienced by DEFGALIS from many of the same people who criticised 
Abdel-Magied. Andrew Bolt made it clear, in an article for the Herald Sun titled ‘Anzac Day 
Betrayed by RSL itself’, that he was opposed to any expression of alternate identities on 
Anzac Day.223 He referred to it as tribalism and declared that the RSL had ‘let services in two 
capitals be hijacked by activists pushing tribal divisions’.224 Specifically, in this case, he was 
referring to the fact that, in Canberra, Indigenous Australian veterans were allowed to march 
together under the Aboriginal flag as an expression of Indigenous Australian identity. For 
Bolt, as Australians first and foremost, the veterans should have marched with their units 
under the Australian flag. Bolt also complained that in Adelaide the dawn service started with 
a Welcome to Country.225 Graham Richardson made the same complaint, clearly resentful 
that he was being ‘welcomed to his own country’.226  
 Discussion about the appropriate way to commemorate Indigenous Australian war 
dead intensified after the Herald Sun published an article titled ‘State government asks if 
Anzac Day should recognise Aborigines attacked by early settlers’.227 The article revealed 
that the Victorian Department of Premier and Cabinet had carried out a survey which had 
sought to determine if people supported the commemoration of Indigenous Australians killed 
during the Frontier Wars as part of official Anzac Day events.228 More than 500 Victorians 
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had responded to the survey, almost one third of whom supported the idea, while 19 percent 
disagreed. Almost half had no opinion either way. The survey had been part of a wider a 
report commissioned by the Premier’s department canvassing ‘the social value of war 
commemorative events’.229 The newspaper article noted discontent from the RSL and from 
the right-wing think tank The Institute of Public Affairs. In response, the Victorian 
Government said that ‘there will be no changes to expand Anzac Day commemorations to 
include Aboriginal people who were killed by white settlers’.230 Despite the government’s 
backdown, public comments and letters to the editor expressed deep disapproval. This was 
exemplified by a comment which stated:  
 
Don’t ruin this day. It is absolutely outrageous to discuss including the “frontier” 
conflicts of Aborigines and early settlers with Anzac Day remembrance ceremonies 
around Australia. As the daughter of a Military Cross-awarded army father (World 
War II), I say no, no, and no.231 
 
The controversy around the inclusion of Indigenous Australian soldiers in Anzac 
commemorations revolved around two claims. First, some commentators disputed the very 
idea that the Frontier Wars had occurred. Carolyn Franklin’s letter to the Herald Sun laid this 
out in plain detail: ‘Is there no one there with a modicum of knowledge of Australian history 
… Australia did not have—ever—“frontier wars”.’232 Second, Indigenous people were 
considered by some to already be included in the national story. In the words of Robin 
Bowles ‘[Indigenous Australians] courageous contribution is already acknowledged in the 
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Anzac Day commemorations held around Australia and New Zealand.’233 As such, activity 
that highlighted the Indigenous experience was seen as an attempt to claim additional 
recognition beyond what was due. Indeed, the 2018 report commissioned by the Victorian 
Government had noted the possibility that people will disapprove of changes to Anzac 
commemorations due to their dislike of Indigenous Australians ‘getting more’.234 Public 
comments confirmed this possibility. A letter to the editor published in the Brisbane Courier 
Mail stated that, regarding Anzac Day: ‘The Aborigines now say they want to be included, 
but they do everything possible to be regarded as a separate, privileged race.’235 This was also 
partly the reason for Andrew Bolt’s opposition to Indigenous Australian veterans marching 
together under the Aboriginal flag.236  
Both of these claims reveal a desire to be selective about the inclusion of Indigenous 
Australian people in the Anzac legend. The logic behind including Aboriginal people who 
were killed in the Frontier Wars makes sense if one believes that Anzac Day is, as the 
Australian War Memorial says, ‘the day on which we remember all Australians who served 
and died in war and on operational service past and present’.237 If we accept that Indigenous 
Australians are and were ‘Australian’, then their deaths during the Frontier Wars ought to be 
commemorated on Anzac Day. However, those opposed to its inclusion fundamentally reject 
the notion that the Frontier Wars form a part of the Australian national narrative. Either they 
did not happen at all and were simply ‘frontier conflicts’, or they occurred before Australia 
existed as a ‘nation’ and thus should not be commemorated. Additionally, opposition on the 
grounds that Indigenous Australian people are already included in the Anzac Narrative 
contains the implicit assumption that the past and present hardships of Indigenous Australians 
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do not need to be highlighted. In both cases, these expressions of Indigenous Australian 
identity and history represent the inclusion of unwanted or inaccurate historical material to 
the Australian narrative. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of the Frontier Wars or the highlighting of the Indigenous 
war experience during Anzac commemorations threatens the dominant romantic plot 
structure. In this case, it threatens the concept of unity that is central to a romantic national 
narrative. The idea that there should be a level of pride and unity on Anzac Day was a 
common expression among those who found issues with both the commemoration of the 
Frontier Wars and the march by Indigenous veterans. Bill Hutton, for instance, declared that 
‘little by little, the “progressives” are undermining and destroying everything that is good and 
worthwhile about our heritage, culture, values and traditions’.238 This theme was also 
prevalent in Bolt’s articles. He expressed the view that both the Abdel-Magied controversy 
and the Indigenous Australian march were part of a wider trend towards disunity that threaten 
Anzac Day. For Bolt, unity on Anzac Day was sacrosanct and the attempts to express what 
Jay Winter calls a ‘hyphen identity’ (i.e. Indigenous-Australian or Muslim-Australian 
identity) threatened that unity. In other words, exploring the tragic experience of Indigenous 
Australian peoples introduces historical material that calls the romantic narrative of unity into 
question. Instead, a tragic plot structure is established in which the ‘conflicts between the 
characters of the narrative are often more terrible than the conflict which initiated the drama’. 
The self-doubting nature of the tragic plot-structure is an anathema to people like Bolt, for 
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Challenging Narrative Structures 
The best way to explain the controversies surrounding Abdel-Magied’s comments, the wreath 
laying ceremony by DEFGALIS and the attempted inclusion of the Frontier Wars is to 
examine it through the lens of competing interpretive communities with conflicting narrative 
structures. The people who criticise Abdel-Magied, DEfGALIS, and the Frontier Wars 
belong to a specific interpretive community which views Anzac Day within a romantic plot 
structure. When faced with commemorative practices that threaten that structure, their 
response is to lash out and decry such practices as historically inaccurate or ‘un-Australian’. 
The controversy should not be understood purely as a conflict of identity but also a conflict of 
narrative.  
Historical selectivity is central to ANZAC Day and it always has been. When the 
Anzac legend was constructed during World War I by Bean, it was explicitly established to 
create a sense of Australian national identity. Only that material which was supported Bean’s 
romantic image of the wild, yet noble Australian soldier was incorporated into the Australian 
legend.239 All else was rigorously censored. This naturally led to the establishment of a 
romantic plot, which soon came to be the narrative at the core of a dominant strand of 
Australian nationalism. As time went on, new material was incorporated into the Anzac 
national narrative, but only to the extent that it ensured the continuation of the romantic plot 
line. Especially to conservative individuals like Bolt, Devine, Richardson and others who 
criticised Abdel-Magied, Anzac Day is a story of unity and heroism. In the words of Andrew 
Bolt: ‘Anzac Day is perhaps the last remaining national day when we take pride in our past 
and honour what we hope are our finest qualities—self, sacrifice, mateship and courage’.240 
References to unity and heroism can also be found among the various letters to the editor and 
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online public comments. Among the comments posted on Abdel-Magied Facebook post, one 
stated that ‘[Anzac Day] is the most sacred day of the year to millions of Australians 
including the families of those who died … that you might have the freedoms you enjoy 
today.’241 Meanwhile, another commenter argued: ‘Anzac Day is a Day of unity, not just 
commemoration, to honour all who have gone off to war since Gallipoli, regardless of their 
skin colour.’242 For this interpretive community, calling into question concepts of national 
unity and heroism on Anzac Day is to call into question the very legitimacy of Australian 
history. 
As a result, anything that does challenges the Australian romantic plot is seen as a 
threat and is attacked. Abdel-Magied’s comments challenged the romantic plot structure by 
introducing plot points that contradict the narrative of Australian progress. By raising the fact 
that refugees suffer in detention at the hands of the Australian government, Abdel-Magied 
was attempting to shape the narrative in order to encourage ‘Australia’ to do better in the 
future.243 However, pointing out the internal failings of Australian government policy, Abdel-
Magied was deviating from the normal romantic plot structure expressed on Anzac Day. 
Similarly, the quiet wreath-laying ceremony by DEFGALIS and the march of Indigenous 
service personnel under the Aboriginal Flag demonstrated the degree to which certain groups 
continue to feel marginalised in Australian society. Their separation from the mainstream 
body of commemoration demonstrates this. Not only does this call into question notions of 
‘Australian national unity’ which are central to the romantic plot structure, it also reveals the 
extent to which Australia still suffers internal conflict. The actions of these individuals, by 
highlighting events that are normally ignored on Anzac Day, emplot a narrative which bears 
more resemblance to the comedic or tragic plot structure than the traditional romantic one. 
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The concept of a tragic Australian national story is one those in the dominant interpretive 
community regularly rail against. This is the ‘white-anting’ to which Andrew Bolt refers. The 
result, therefore, is to attack those who raise it as un-Australian. 
While minority groups are given the chance to superficially express their identity on 
Anzac Day, they are prevented from demanding any fundamental change to the narrative. 
Stan Grant’s celebration of his Aboriginality, for instance, fitted within an overarching 
romantic plot structure and did not invite criticism. He incorporated the experience of 
Indigenous Australian soldiers within an overarching concept of Australian mateship, 
heroism, and unity on the frontlines—if not back home. Grant’s expression of his Aboriginal 
identity therefore did not threaten the dominant romantic plot structure commemorated on 
Anzac Day. Commenters seemed willing to engage with this kind of multicultural romantic 
narrative. One letter to the editor published in The Courier Mail argued that Anzac Day was 
‘not a day for divisive activism’ but also pointed out that ‘indigenous war veterans who 
fought for Australia continue to be unrecognised’.244 On the other hand, discussion about the 
Frontier Wars complicate the romantic narrative. It does this by engaging with the history of 
dispossession and genocide, brought about by European settlement and the establishment of a 
white Australian nation in 1901. In this way, the Australian narrative is able ignore the 
history of the Frontier Wars and avoid taking responsibility for its impacts in the present. It is 
easier to simply reject the very existence of the Frontier Wars and to attack those who suggest 
commemorating it, than it is to explore its consequences. Especially, because this may 
potentially force one to re-evaluate the romantic structure of the Australian national narrative. 
However, what is noteworthy that, unlike in Russia, the government is not 
predominately responsible for defending the national narrative. While politicians do have 
something to say on issues regarding national identity, it is largely maintained by social 
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commentators and private individuals using social media. This suggests that Australian 
national identity is so strongly rooted in personal identity that the government does not need 
activity to defend it. Ironically, this makes it as difficult to express alternative interpretations 
of history or identity in the Australian context as it is in the Russian context. The idea that 





Chapter 4: The European Day of Remembrance for the 
Victims of Nazism and Stalinism 
 
In 2008, the Parliament of the European Union (EU) established a commemorative day on the 
23 August called ‘the European day of Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and 
Stalinism’.245 In theory, the new commemorative day was designed to reconcile the divergent 
national narratives of eastern and western EU states regarding the history of World War II. 
The national narratives of western states typically regarded the Nazis as the primary 
antagonists of the war, while the national narratives of states in the East placed a much 
greater focus on the crimes of the Soviet Union. This cleavage in European memory was seen 
by some scholars and politicians to be a significant barrier to European integration. In 2009, 
Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Zita Pleštinská argued that ‘Europe will never be 
united if it does not manage to achieve a united view on its own history.’246 Therefore, by 
jointly commemorating the victims of Nazism and Stalinism together on 23 August, it was 
argued that eastern and western memories of World War II could be reframed in a pan-
European supra-national narrative. 
 The concept of totalitarianism provided the theoretical basis by which the joint 
commemoration of the victims of Nazism and Stalinism was justified. According to 
totalitarian theorists, such as Hannah Arendt, Joachim Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the 
Nazi and Soviet regimes were both totalitarian states which shared certain essential features. 
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For instance, totalitarian theory claims that neither regime set limits on governmental 
authority, and both used terror, personality cults, and concentration camps to maintain their 
political power.247 The centrality of totalitarian theory to 23 August as a commemorative day 
is reflected in the date, which was chosen to coincide with the anniversary of the signing of 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This was a non-aggression pact signed in 1939 between Nazi 
Germany and the USSR. In the words of the European Parliament’s president, Jerzy Buzek, 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact symbolised ‘the collusion of the two worst forms of 
totalitarianism in the history of humanity’.248 
 The creation of a new commemorative day on 23 August, however, did not bring 
about a unification of eastern and western national narratives. This was due to several factors. 
First, the majority of people in western Europe remained indifferent to any attempt to 
interpret World War II within a totalitarian paradigm. Second, although western EU 
politicians supported the creation of 23 August as a commemorative day, western political 
elites remained committed to their original interpretation of World War II history. The 
unwillingness of liberal western elites to engage with totalitarian theory may have been 
related to the reluctance of many modern academics in the west to draw equivalence between 
the Nazi and Stalinist states. Meanwhile, some Jewish and human rights activists saw 
commemoration of 23 August as being disrespectful towards the victims of the Holocaust. It 
has even been claimed that the attempt to place totalitarian theory at the heart of EU memory 
culture was part of a broader attempt by Eastern European Nationalists to obfuscate the true 
history of the Holocaust.249 A potential third factor for the failures of 23 August stems from 
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the assertion that this day was designed to legitimise problematic elements in the national 
narratives of eastern European states. In this context, it is perhaps unsurprising that a 
European supra-national narrative built around the joint commemoration of Nazi and Soviet 
victims failed to materialise. 
 In the following chapter, I explore what these failures to create a European supra-
national narrative tell us about the potential for national narratives to be inclusive. My focus 
in this chapter is generally on official discourse and political elites, rather than the general 
public. I do not focus on the public out of a desire to limit the scope of my research. I have 
also already explored the complex interactions between elites, official discourse, and the 
general public in my previous chapters.  
The chapter consists of four sections. First, I explore the concept of ‘narrative 
negotiation’ and explain why it is relevant to this theme. Second, I discuss the aims and 
objectives of Eastern European politicians during the process of the creation of 23 August as 
a day of commemoration. Third, I identify the successes and failures of 23 August as a supra-




The efforts to establish a common supra-national narrative at the heart of EU memory is 
perhaps best understood as part of a wider reconciliation process between East and West 
Europe. Political reconciliation depends on the reconciliation of historical narratives. This in 
turn requires that historical narratives be negotiated between conflicting parties. This process 
is sometimes referred to as ‘narrative negotiation’.250 
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Narrative negotiation is a process of dealing with historical pains or injustices through 
the negotiation and revision of historical narratives. It involves a process of give-and-take, 
whereby parties negotiate a common narrative by giving up certain aspects of their collective 
stories while incorporating new elements from the other’s narrative into their own. Narrative 
negotiation can often be most clearly seen in the public and political sphere during periods 
when there is public debate about the appropriateness of monuments, or the contents of 
national museums and history textbooks. Other examples of narrative negotiation include the 
issuing of formal apologies by politicians, the payment of reparations, or the establishment of 
truth commissions.251 Specific examples will be explored later in this chapter. 
The process of narrative negotiation takes place across multiple levels of society. 
Cultural and political elites cannot simply revise the story, but are in a constant process of 
negotiation with other members of their own group.252 Again, one can make reference to 
Duncan Bell’s theory of mythscapes, in which he reminds us that official narratives are 
constantly competing and negotiating with the narratives of other groups in society.253 John 
Torpey calls narrative negotiation a ‘communitive history’ due to this democratic element.254 
Having said that, narrative negotiation can be difficult when some sections of society are 
unwilling to surrender certain narratives. This may cause tensions to flare, both between 
different groups within society and between different national groups.  
In order to illustrate narrative negotiation, I am going to give a hypothetical example 
before proceeding to a historical one. Imagine two countries: Country A and Country B. 
Country A was once an imperial power which ruled over Country B, until Country B gained 
independence following a brief but bloody war. In Country A’s official narrative, its 
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imperialist past is justified by claiming that the empire brought with it democracy, the rule of 
law, and better standards of living to those who lived within it. The fact that Country B 
committed war crimes during the war of independence is highlighted in the official story. 
This is used to demonise the revolutionaries and further justify Country A’s imperial rule. On 
the other hand, in Country B’s official narrative, Country A’s empire is represented as having 
been racist, authoritarian, and exploitative. This is used as justification for Country B’s 
eventual war of independence. The extra-legal punitive actions that occurred during that war 
are seen as having been necessary in response to Country A’s brutal regime. Furthermore, the 
fact that Country A does not officially recognise the destructive nature of its past imperial 
rule is used to demonise the contemporary citizens of the country. Present relations between 
Country A and Country B are frosty, due in part to their contradictory national narratives.  
In order for these two hypothetical countries to establish a more peaceful working 
relationship, it might be necessary for them to go through a process of narrative negotiation. 
To do this, the governments of both Country A and Country B would have to give up 
elements of their official narrative. Country A’s government, for instance, might have to 
recognise that its imperial rule was not wholly positive. Country B’s government, on the 
other hand, might have to accept that some of the actions taken in pursuit of national 
independence were illegal and immoral. Supporting this process, Country A might pay 
reparations to Country B for damages done during the imperial regime. Meanwhile, in 
Country B, war criminals might be arrested and brought to justice. Museums in both 
countries might be reorganised and history textbooks rewritten so that neither side demonises 
the other. However, these efforts undertaken by the governments of both countries could be 
stymied by the general public. Individuals in Country B who have memories of mistreatment 
at the hands of Country A might be unwilling to forgive so easily. On the other hand, 
particularly patriotic individuals in Country A might abhor the idea that the empire was not 
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necessarily a force for good. Should these voices be loud enough, it is possible that the 
process of narrative negotiation might stall. 
Narrative negotiation is not always an easy process. In the words of Nadim Bassem 
Khoury, it is ‘identity-costly and identity-changing for both parties’.255 In the case of national 
identity this can be particularly difficult. Homi Bhabha tells us that the nation is a narration. 
Like every cultural practice, the meaning of the ‘nation’ is constructed through narrative 
processes that resemble and include the narrative constructions of novels, films, and history 
books.256 It is a story about a community: a story of which every member of that community 
is a part. The past, the present, and the future of individuals who believe that they comprise 
the nation see themselves as linked to the past, the present, and the future of the nation 
itself.257 This makes the nation more than just a political community. It is a core part of an 
individual’s identity. Precisely because narrative negotiation aims at disrupting long-held 
narratives about the past, the narrative negotiation process can be seen as a direct threat to the 
identity of certain national groups.258 
Giving up aspects of the national narrative while incorporating elements from an 
alternative group’s narrative can change the way people view their group in the past, and 
subsequently their group in the present. For instance, it might force individuals to re-evaluate 
stories about their nation’s good intentions or their enemies’ past transgressions. In turn, this 
might force individuals to re-evaluate the lessons they thought they had learnt from the past. 
This makes narrative negotiation especially costly and difficult for communities whose 
members hold strongly onto their nationalist accounts. By the same token, this makes 
narrative negotiation identity-changing. By altering the narratives central to many peoples’ 
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identity, that identity is itself challenged and changed. On the other hand, narrative 
negotiation does not mean that both parties will agree on a shared narrative. Indeed, in many 
cases this is impossible. However, as Andrew Schaap points out, ‘a reconciliatory movement 
is not construed as a final shared understanding or convergence of world views, but as 
disclosures of a world in common from diverse and possibly irreconcilable perspectives’.259 
The small South Australian town of Elliston provides an excellent micro-study of the 
highly fraught nature of narrative negotiation. In the local community there circulates a 
number of local legends about Indigenous Australian people being driven over a cliff to their 
deaths as payback for the murder of several white settlers.260 Over the years, these legends 
have ignited a great deal of community debate about what did or did not happen in and 
around Elliston in the mid nineteenth century. For some members of the community, 
especially those descended from the early settlers, there has been a reluctance to admit that 
any large-scale massacres occurred.261 Other members of the community accept that there 
were killings, but reject the idea that Indigenous Australian peoples were run off the cliffs at 
Waterloo bay. On the other hand, John Moriaty, the deputy president of the South Australian 
Aborigines Progress Association, stated that ‘The Elliston massacre was part of the history of 
the West Coast Aboriginal population, despite strenuous efforts by the relatives of the whites 
involved to discredit what is a well-known fact.’262  
Attempts to restore unity to the community regarding the massacre has required 
bringing together the memories of local, predominantly white, settlers with the oral histories 
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of Indigenous Australian peoples. In 2017 a memorial was unveiled at Elliston. The memorial 
plaque stated that: 
 
This monument commemorates an incident referred to by the traditional owners of 
this land as “The Massacre of Waterloo Bay”. A number of Aboriginal people were 
killed near this site in May, 1849 by a party of settlers. 
Waterloo Bay is a significant site in the history of frontier conflict between traditional 
owners and settlers, often resulting in the destruction of traditional family life. 
This memorial promotes a new spirit of reconciliation, helping to forge a renewed and 
healing sense of community through tolerance and understanding.263 
 
The wording of this plaque was much debated in Elliston. It reflects not one story but 
an attempt to meld several different narratives. It is noteworthy that the plaque does not 
commemorate a massacre but ‘an incident referred to by the traditional owners … as “The 
Massacre of Waterloo Bay”’.264 The hedging of the word massacre acknowledges the 
traditional Indigenous narrative without contradicting the belief held by other members of the 
community who do not accept that numerous Indigenous people were actually driven to their 
deaths over the cliffs. Another point to note is that exact numbers—a point of contention in 
the community—are left out of the memorial. The memorial also finishes on a forward-
looking note, perhaps in the hope that the past can be left behind and a new common 
communal identity be built.  
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Narrative negotiation is an historical enterprise. Historians are therefore central to the 
process. Considering their importance in the construction of national narratives in the first 
place, it is not surprising that historians are involved in their re-negotiation. Historians add an 
air of expert authority which contributes to the perceived authenticity of the negotiated 
narrative. Having said that, the historians who engage in these narrative negotiations 
generally still work within the bounds of historical research. A chief concern, therefore, for 
historians engaged in this process is to ensure that the common conventions of historical 
research are still observed, despite the divisive nature of the narratives that are being 
negotiated. Indeed, according to historian Elazar Barkan, bilateral historical commissions are 
often able to keep nationalist assumptions in check by bringing together historians of 
different nationalities in the joint writing of history. This, Barken claims, is also more likely 
to produce accurate research.265 In this way, it is hoped the nationalist myths that create and 
reproduce conflict can be debunked and reconciliation achieved. However, simply melding 
the nationalist narratives of two competing countries does not always result in more accurate 
historical research. The idea that the truth must be found as a compromise between two 
opposite positions is a well-known fallacy. For this reason, the interests of historians are not 
always aligned with the interests of politicians engaged in narrative negotiation.266  
Narrative negotiation is most commonly applied to peace negotiations between 
conflicting powers, or reconciliation between historically dominant and historically 
persecuted ethnic groups. Examples of events aimed at narrative reconciliation include: 
German reparations for, and memorials to, the Holocaust; the Australian Prime Minister’s 
apology to the Stolen Generation; and the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
 
265 Elazar Barkan, ‘Engaging History: Managing Conflict and Reconciliation,’ History Workshop Journal Vol. 
59(1) (2005), 235. 
266 Khoury, The Negotiation of National Narratives, 22. 
90 
 
Commission.267 There have also been attempts at narrative negotiation between Israel and 
Palestine in order to foster a lasting peace. However, these attempts have largely failed.268  
The concept of narrative negotiation may not immediately seem relevant to the 
establishment of the European Day of Remembrance for the victims of Nazism and Stalinism. 
The states involved are not in direct conflict with one another and officially no EU member 
state is dominant over the others. The supra-national narrative created by the European Day 
of Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and Stalin does not aim to bring to light crimes 
committed by western states against eastern states. However, as I demonstrate below, there 
was a perception among many Eastern European nationalists that their historical experiences 
were excluded from the memory discourse of the EU. A key aspect of the European Day of 
Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and Stalinism was the recognition of the historical 
persecution of Eastern European states. This naturally involves a level of narrative 
negotiation between the dominant memory discourse of East and West Europe. The need to 
re-negotiate the narratives of World War II to incorporate totalitarian theory might best be 
seen as a form of attempted reconciliation between the memory communities of east and 
west.  
 
The Creation, Aims, and Objectives of 23 August 
Any attempt to understand the logic behind the development of 23 August as a supra-national 
commemorative day has to incorporate an investigation of the history of official EU memory 
culture. From the beginning of its existence as the European Coal and Steel Community in 
1951, the EU’s commitment to European peace and cooperation was defined by reference to 
the destruction wrought during World War II.269 Yet, as has already been stated, there existed 
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a divide in the way World War II was remembered and commemorated in the national 
narratives of member states in east and west Europe. Prior to the creation of the European 
Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and Stalinism, the dominant overarching EU 
narrative of World War II was at odds with the dominant national narratives in many eastern 
European countries. This memory divide had caused friction between east and west European 
EU states. In 2009, Maria Mӓlksoo, a researcher at the University of Tartu in Estonia, argued 
that the subaltern status of eastern European collective memory meant that eastern European 
countries had a ‘persistent sense of “liminal Europeanness” in the enlarged EU’.270 Over the 
years this sense had not dissipated and, as Aleida Assmann suggests, ‘there is as yet no end in 
sight … [to the] contestations along national borders when it comes to interpreting, 
representing, and commemorating the European past.’271 A common narrative was seen by 
these researchers as a solution to the divide in memory.272  
 Prior to 2004, the European Union reflected the official memory culture of most 
western European states in that it held the Holocaust to be the ultimate crime of the twentieth 
century.273 Yet the centrality of the Holocaust in EU memory culture did not come about until 
fairly recently. During the early stages of the Cold War, little attention was paid to the Jewish 
nature of the Holocaust. Instead, a myth of national resistance and a claimed victimhood 
status permeated the national narratives of the states of western Europe. Only after a series of 
war-crime trials in the 1960s and 1970s, along with an academic re-evaluation of wartime 
resistance and collaboration, did the Shoah come to the forefront of official western European 
memory. It is debatable how far the general population adopted the experiences of the 
Holocaust into their understanding of national history. However, at the official level western 
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politicians began to engage with and address its historical importance. By the end of the 
twentieth century, historian Tony Judt argued, the centrality of the Holocaust in western 
European identity and memory seemed secure.274 
Reflecting the evolution of its member states, the EU progressively adopted several 
policies that recognised the Holocaust as the ‘ultimate evil’ against which the identity of a 
united Europe could be defined. In 2000, the European Parliament called for the 
commemoration of Holocaust Memorial Day on 27 January.275 This date was chosen on the 
grounds that it was the anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz by the Red Army. One year 
later, in a written declaration, the European Parliament argued that the ‘Holocaust must be 
forever seared in the collective memory of all peoples’.276 The prominent role that the 
Holocaust had acquired in western European memory discourse contradicted totalitarian 
theory. By holding the Holocaust as a unique crime that could not be compared to other 
genocides, the EU was implicitly recognising Nazism as a uniquely destructive ideology. 
Indeed, the commemoration of the liberation of Aushwitz only made sense while the soldiers 
of the Soviet Union were regarded as potential ‘liberators’. If the events of 27 January are 
explored through the lens of totalitarian theory, then the arrival of the Red Army at the gates 
of Auschwitz did not signify liberation from the Nazi dictatorship. Rather, it represented a 
simple transfer of management between two totalitarian powers.  
Following the 2004 Eastern enlargement, however, a competing memory framework 
arose to challenge this dominant western interpretation of World War II. As a condition of 
membership, the ten new central and eastern European countries (CEECs) were pressured to 
‘document and clarify’ the crimes against humanity committed on their territory during 
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World War II.277 The pressure came from an unstated assumption that a recognition of 
uniqueness of the Holocaust was a non-negotiable prerequisite for accession to the EU.278 
Western scholars had already documented examples of eastern European Nazi collaboration 
and there was an expectation that the new states would take steps to expose the involvement 
of local collaborators in the Holocaust.279 In other words, the CEECs were expected to adopt 
the official memory culture of the EU. However, the governments of the CEECs regarded this 
imposition of western European memory to be insensitive to the experiences of eastern 
European populations during World War II. In the official discourse of these countries, 1945 
did not represent the end of the Holocaust and the Nazi dictatorship but rather the start of a 
new period of Soviet repression.280 Furthermore, the history of the Holocaust had largely 
been neglected in the CEECs and so it did not hold the same prominent position as it did in 
the west.281 As a result, although most CEECs supported the overarching EU memory culture 
in official discourse, MEPs from these countries began seriously to question the established 
World War II narrative.  
The frustration of MEPs from CEECs regarding the dominance of west European 
memory culture came to a head on 3 June 2008, when the Czech government hosted a 
conference on ‘European Conscience and Communism’. The so-called Prague declaration, 
which was drafted during the conference, demanded that the European Union ‘equally 
evaluate totalitarian regimes’.282 The declaration was signed by politicians from numerous 
CEECs and nationalist European parties. Signatories included former President of 
Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel, former Lithuanian Head of State and conservative politician, 
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Vytautas Landsbergis, and East German anti-communist civil rights activist and future 
German President, Joachim Gauck. The declaration was also signed by conservative UK 
politician Christopher Beazley and received letters of support from conservative former UK 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and developer of totalitarian theory, Zbigniew Brzezinski. 
The main focus of the declaration was the condemnation of the crimes of the Soviet Union. 
Yet, the crimes of the USSR were presented in the framework of totalitarian theory and were 
regarded as being as equal to those of the Nazi regime. The declaration argued that western 
Europe was not adequately educated about the crimes of communism and that a common 
approach regarding the crimes of both Soviet and Nazi regimes had to be established.283 To 
this end, it made a wide range of suggestions, including: 
 
5. ‘Ensuring the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination of victims of all 
the totalitarian regimes,’ 
9. ‘establishment of 23 August, the day of signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact ..., as a day 
of remembrance of the victims of both Nazi and Communist totalitarian regimes, in 
the same way Europe remembers the victims of the Holocaust on 27 January,’ 
15. ‘establishment of an Institute of European Memory and Conscience which would 
be both, A) a European research institute for totalitarianism studies, developing 
scientific and educational projects and providing support to networking of national 
research institutes specialising in the subject of totalitarian experience, B) and a pan-
European museum/memorial of victims of all totalitarian regimes, with an aim to 
memorialise victims of these regimes and raise awareness of the crimes committed by 
them,’ 
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17. ‘adjustment and overhaul of European history textbooks so that children could 
learn and be warned about Communism and its crimes in the same way as they have 
been taught to assess the Nazi crimes,’284  
 
After the Prague Declaration, MEPs from CEECs began to actively campaign for the 
re-evaluation of official EU memory culture which would incorporate an equal condemnation 
of Nazism and Stalinism. The Reconciliation of European Histories Group was established 
shortly after the 3 June as an informal, multiparty working group with the aim of promoting 
the Prague Declaration in the European Union. Only a few months later, five members of the 
European Parliament (from Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Germany, and the United Kingdom)285 
put forward a declaration on the proclamation of 23 August as the European Day of 
Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and Stalinism.286 This declaration was signed by 
409 members of the European Parliament. As a result, 23 August was officially recognised by 
the EU as a day of commemoration.  
However, while the European Union officially observed 23 August, very few 
European Member States staged commemorative events. Official commemorations occurred 
only in Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Hungary, and 
Slovenia. Therefore, with the sole exception of Sweden, the commemorative day did not 
spread into western Europe and a supra-national narrative based on totalitarian theory did not 
emerge. As a result, a resolution was introduced to the European Parliament on 2 April 2009 
which called on its member states to implement the Europe Day of Remembrance for Victims 
of Nazism and Stalinism. The resolution was passed by a vote of 533 to 44, with 33 
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abstentions.287 Following the resolution of 2009, the president of the European Parliament, 
Hans-Gert Pöttering, thanked the Baltic states for their efforts to better inform western 
Europe on the totalitarianism of the Soviet Union. He also referenced academic Hannah 
Arendt who developed ‘criteria to describe totalitarianism’ and concluded that ‘both 
totalitarianism systems (Stalinism and Nazism) are comparable and terrible’.288  
 During the debates leading up to the declaration of 23 August, several prominent 
MEPs from eastern Europe attempted to encourage the integration of totalitarian theory into 
EU memory culture by framing it within the context of European integration. During the 
Explanation of Votes following the 2 April 2009 resolution on totalitarianism, Slovakian 
MEP Zita Pleštinská argued that ‘we must acknowledge communism and Nazism as a 
common inheritance and hold a specialist debate on all of the crimes committed by 
totalitarian regimes in the last century.’289 On the same day, Estonian MEP Edite Estrela 
stated that ‘Europe will not be united unless it is able to reach a common view of its history 
and conduct an honest and thorough debate on the crimes committed by Nazism, [and] 
Stalinism’.290 The language of integration and European unity was linked to a dichotomy 
between totalitarian and democratic systems which was frequently employed in support of the 
resolution. For instance, Jozef Pinior of Poland argued that  
 
the unity of Europe, the Charter of Fundamental rights, the rule of law prevailing all 
over the world, no acceptance of torture—this is our response stemming from the 
 
287 European Union, European Parliament, ‘European conscience and totalitarianism’, Vote, April 2, 2009, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=PV&reference=20090402&secondRef=ITEM-009-
20&language=EN&ring=P6-RC-2009-0165. 
288 ‘Baltic States opened Western Europe’s eyes on Soviet Union totalitarianism – EP chairman in Vilnius’ 
Baltic News Service, 2009, http://www.euro.lt/en/news/lithuanias-membership-in-the-eu/news/5537/?print=1, 
Achieved at https://web.archive.org/web/20110722150204 on 22/6/2011. 
289 ‘Motion for a Resolution (European conscience and totalitarianism,’ Pleštinská. 
290 European Union, European Parliament, ‘Motion for a Resolution (European conscience and totalitarianism)’ 





legacy of the 20th century: the struggle for democracy, the struggle against all manner 
of dictatorships and against totalitarian regimes.291  
 
This dichotomy between totalitarianism and liberalism achieved two things. First, it 
aligned support for totalitarian theory with support for the EU. Second, it encouraged the idea 
that the acceptance of totalitarian theory in European memory culture entailed support for 
international human rights. The rejection of totalitarian theory, on the other hand, represented 
the whitewashing of the crimes of authoritarian governments.  
MEPs from the CEECs also started to call for a greater recognition of eastern 
European suffering during World War II and the Cold War. Many of the eastern European 
MEPs expressed dismay at what they saw as western Europe’s failure to understand the 
crimes of communism. Pleštinská bemoaned the fact that ‘even today many people do not 
know about the regimes that terrorised their fellow citizens in Central and Eastern Europe of 
40 years and divided them from democratic Europe with the Iron Curtain and the Berlin 
Wall’.292 Similarly, Estonian MEP Katrin Saks of the Estonian Social Democratic Party 
claimed that ‘a large part of the history of Eastern Europe is unwritten, or at least few are 
aware of it’.293 Saks argued that it was a ‘moral obligation’ that the parliament of the 
European Union should speak out about what happened in eastern Europe.294 Some MEPs 
from the CEECs even argued that Western Europe should learn more about specific ‘heroes’. 
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For instance, Polish MEP Adam Bielan expressed a desire that ‘European society ... know 
more about Polish heroes, such as Cavalry Captain Witold Pilecki’.295 In 1940, Pilecki had 
voluntarily entered Auschwitz to gather information for the Polish resistance, but after the 
war he was arrested and executed by the Communist Polish Ministry of Security. His story 
thereby symbolically represented the brutality of both Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism. The 
desire for recognition regarding the suffering of eastern European peoples was a common 
topic in the debates leading up to the vote on the resolution of 23 August. On 25 March 2009, 
member of the European commission Ján Fingeľ explicitly stated that ‘the member states in 
western Europe need to be more aware of the tragic history of the member states in the east, 
which is part of our shared, common, European history’.296 Not only did this underline the 
idea that western Europe needed to be taught more about communism, but it emphasised the 
idea that the adoption of totalitarian theory was an essential element in European integration. 
The attempt to reframe the overarching dominant memory culture of the EU within a 
totalitarian paradigm officially resolved the commemorative divide between eastern and 
western member states. However, the ‘equal evaluation’ of the crimes of Nazi Germany and 
the USSR served a purpose beyond the creation of a pan-European supra-national narrative. 
Unbeknownst to some MEPs in west European states, the incorporation of totalitarian theory 
into the history of World War II legitimised some of the more contentious elements present in 
the national narratives of CEECs. In particular, it allowed for a more favourable re-evaluation 
of local wartime support for the Nazi regime, supposedly in response to the actions and 
crimes of the Soviet Union.  
 
295European Union, European Parliament, ‘Motion for a Resolution (European conscience and totalitarianism)’ 
Parliamentary Debate: Explanation of Votes, Adam Bielan, April 2, 2009, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20090402+ITEM-
010+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
296 European Union, European Parliament, ‘European Conscience and Totalitarianism, Debate, Ján Fingeľ, 





During World War II, the Nazi regime had depended on both military and economic 
alliances with other sovereign states, as well as the collaboration of local individuals in 
countries overrun by German armies. The German state occupied Poland, the three Baltic 
states, parts of Czechoslovakia, parts of France, and parts of Yugoslavia. Collaborationist 
regimes were established in France, Greece, Norway, Slovakia, Croatia, and Serbia. Alliances 
were established between the German government and Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and 
Italy. Individuals and institutions from all of these countries helped to establish the German 
domination of Europe. In some instances, these collaborators were directly involved in the 
implementation of Nazi war crimes. In Ukraine, for instance, Ukrainian auxiliary militia 
helped the German Einsatzgruppen (Action Groups) to round up and murder local Jewish 
people. A notorious example of this collaboration was the Babi Yar massacres, when around 
35,000 Jews were killed on 29 and 30 September 1941 by German troops and Ukrainian 
militiamen.297 A similar situation occurred in the Baltic states. According to Ruth Bettina 
Birn: ‘While occupied by the Germans, [the three Baltic states] were allowed to maintain 
forms of self-government in which native collaborators participated and became instrumental 
in implementing the most heinous German policies.’298 Many non-German individuals served 
in German-sponsored military formations, which not only fought against the USSR, but 
played an important role in the implementation of the Holocaust.  
Following the incorporation of totalitarian theory into the memory culture of the EU, 
it became increasingly common for politicians and public elites in CEECs to imply that 
wartime collaboration with the Nazi regime was not a moral failure. Instead, some of those 
who collaborated are now regarded as heroes in the dominant national narratives espoused by 
governments and nationalists. On 21 June 2017, in Hungary, for instance, Prime Minister 
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Viktor Orbán asserted that the Hungarian nation was only able to survive because of ‘some 
exceptional statesmen like Regent Miklos Horthy’.299 In 1941, Horthy had sent Hungary 
troops to support the Wehrmacht’s invasion of the Soviet Union. Horthy was also a self-
declared anti-Semite, who deported over 400,000 Hungarian Jews to German death camps 
between 15 May and 9 June 1944.300 However, in the historical narrative of nationalists like 
Orbán, collaboration with the Nazis has been reinterpreted as an unpalatable but necessary 
means of opposing the USSR.  
The theory of totalitarianism thus allows those who fought alongside the Germany 
Army to be reframed as anti-Soviet patriots. If Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia were 
equally totalitarian, then there was no moral difference between those who sided with the 
USSR to fight Germany and those who sided with Germany to fight the USSR. From the 
nationalist perspective, therefore, the foreign policy decisions made by the Hungarian and 
Romanian governments in the 1930s and 1940s to ally with the Nazis should be seen in the 
same light as the decision of the British and American governments to join forces with the 
USSR. The tens of thousands of eastern European men who volunteered to serve Nazi 
occupiers as policemen and soldiers could be viewed as heroic nationalists, rather than as 
participants in a genocide. For many nationalists in eastern European states, aligning with the 
Nazis does not necessarily imply support for Hitler’s racial reordering of Europe. Instead it 
was a logical geopolitical choice during a complex time.301  
The re-evaluation of local pro-German collaborators as anti-Communist freedom 
fighters was central to the national narratives that formed in several post-Soviet states 
following the collapse of the USSR. In Latvia, for instance, the Latvian collaborators who 
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fought in the Waffen SS ‘Latvian Legion’ are commemorated every year on 16 March. 
Latvian Legion Day, as it is called, memorialises the day in 1944 when two Latvian divisions 
of the Waffen SS participated in combat operations against an advancing Soviet offensive. In 
the Latvian nationalist narrative, the soldiers of the Latvian Legion had not fought for Hitler 
or National Socialism. Instead, as the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs states, they had 
joined in ‘the crusade against Bolshevism’ and ‘The Germans were needed as allies in the 
fight against the detested Soviet Union.’302 The day was officially commemorated by the 
Latvian government between 1998 and 2000, but international pressure meant the day’s 
official status was revoked in January 2000. Nonetheless, processions of legionaries and their 
supporters continue to take place every year. While the Latvian government does not 
officially endorse these commemorations, government ministers have attended in a private 
capacity. Furthermore, the Latvian government does officially support the right of 
nationalists to commemorate Latvian Legion Day.303 The government also continues to deny 
that the Legion was a collaborationist organisation or that it had any association with war 
crimes. As of 1 January 2019, five out of seventeen articles on the Latvian Foreign Affairs 
Ministry’s ‘Latvian History’ page relate directly to the Latvian Legion. All five articles 
defend its legacy and right to commemorate it.304 
However, the Latvian government’s defence of the Legion tends to reply on the 
manipulation of certain historical facts. For example, the government supports its claim that 
the Latvian Legion was not involved in the Holocaust by pointing out that it was not formed 
until 1943, by which time the vast majority of Latvian Jews were already dead. Therefore, in 
the words of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ‘There is absolutely no reason to claim 
that there were any direct links between the Latvian Legion … and the war crimes that were 
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previously committed by military or paramilitary organisations.’305 However, as several 
western scholars, journalists, and documentary makers point out, the core of the Legion had 
been comprised of men who had previously served the Nazis as police auxiliaries. These 
police units had unquestionably been involved in the Holocaust. Therefore, the claim that 
there were no direct links between the Legion and the implementation of the Holocaust is 
simply false.306 Furthermore, an article by Leanid Kazyrytski, published in Criminal Law 
Forum in 2016, linked the Legion to several crimes against humanity committed during the 
anti-partisan movement in Belarus.307  
With the incorporation of totalitarian theory into official EU memory discourse, 
MEPs and political elites in CEECs were able to defend their support for commemorative 
events like the Latvian Legion without contradicting official EU memory culture. The 
pressure that the EU placed on the countries of Eastern Europe prior to 2004 to ‘document 
and clarify’ World War II crimes against humanity threatened to expose many of the myths 
and half-truths that had developed around collaborationist organizations like the Latvian 
Legion. This would have made their status as heroes in the national narrative untenable. 
However, the moral relativism inherent in the concept of totalitarianism allowed CEECs to 
argue that these collaborators simply chose to fight another equally evil totalitarian regime. 
The Holocaust, in this context, was incorporated into a complex narrative of competing 
totalitarian crimes against humanity. In the words of the Latvian Foreign Ministry: ‘The 
chapters of history are not only written in black and white.’308  
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The development of the European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism 
and Stalinism was therefore undoubtably an attempt to reconcile the competing national 
narratives of states in east and west Europe. Yet 23 August also served to reframe the 
overarching memory culture of the EU in a way that provided legitimacy to some of the more 
problematic aspects of the national narratives of the CEECs. In order to achieve this, the 
MEPs from the CEECs were highly selective in the arguments they deployed. Totalitarianism 
was discussed largely in reference to the suffering of eastern European populations during 
and after World War II, or as part of a dichotomy with western Liberalism. The fact that the 
incorporation of totalitarian theory called into question the centrality of the Holocaust in EU 
memory culture was not acknowledged by MEPs from members states of the CEECs during 
the debates in the lead-up to the establishment of 23 August. The fact that this discussion did 
not go ahead suggests that western MEPs may have voted for 23 Augustout of ignorance 
regarding its broader impact on a common EU memory. Therefore, the underlying tension 
between the memory culture of western and eastern EU member states was not actually 
resolved.   
 
The successes and failures of 23 August 
The establishment of 23 August as the European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of 
Nazism and Stalinism encouraged several EU initiatives which took totalitarian theory from 
political discourse to the public sphere. Of these, the most influential was the Platform of 
European Memory and Conscience. The Platform was an educational project which brought 
together 55 public and private institutions and organisations from 19 countries, including 
member and non-member states of the EU. One of its stated goals was ‘to increase public 
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awareness about European history and the crimes committed by totalitarian regimes’.309 
Another stated aim was ‘to support initiatives at the European level with a view to giving 
indiscriminate treatment to all crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
as well as to their victims’.310 Both of these goals not only took totalitarian theory as an 
accepted model of viewing the past, but also sought to establish totalitarian theory as the 
accepted model of history in the discursive paradigms of the public. The Platform further 
drew on several eastern European government-affiliated research institutions. These included 
the Institute of National Remembrance in Poland and the Institute for the Study of 
Totalitarian Regimes in the Czech Republic. Both institutions promoted historical research 
within a framework of totalitarian theory. Museums have also played a part in establishing 
totalitarian theory within public discourse. The House of Terror Museum in Hungary, and the 
Museum of the Occupation of Latvia, for instance, placed the story of the Soviet and Nazi 
eras side by side. They made direct comparisons between them, and implicitly judged them to 
be equivalent. Yet, while these museums made a theoretical equivalence between Nazism and 
Communism, they concentrate in practice on Communist crimes and say little about Nazi 
ones.311  
The efforts to spread totalitarian theory into the public sphere have been partially 
successful online. For example, in 2017 the Wikipedia article on ‘Comparisons of Nazism 
and Stalinism’ was written within the framework of totalitarian theory.312 The article implied 
that Nazism and Stalinism were equal forms of rule which committed equally destructive 
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crimes against humanity.313 This can be observed most sharply in the section titled ‘Anti-
Semitism and Genocide’. The entire section was written by a single user on 1 June 2017.314 
Until 2 June 2018, the only change to the section was the capitalisation of the word 
‘Genocide’ in the title, which was edited by an anonymous user. The entire section was 
disproportionally focused on the Soviet Union’s anti-Semitism. Four (arguably five) of the 
five paragraphs that comprised the section were dedicated to the condemnation of 
communism. The first paragraph discussed the Soviet Union’s suppression of Jewish culture. 
The second focused on Stalin’s personal anti-Semitism. The third paragraph declared that 
Hitler stated: ‘since we are socialists, we must necessarily also be anti-Semites’,315 and 
compared Hitler’s statements to works by Friedrich Engels. The fourth paragraph argued that 
the ‘policies of both the Nazis and Stalinists culminated in a campaign of ethnic cleansing 
and persecution’.316 The final paragraph argued that Stalin’s regime was an accomplice in 
Hitler’s Holocaust.  
Admittedly, with a few exceptions, a lot of what was stated in the section on anti-
Semitism is not untrue. Both Nazi and Soviet regimes pursued anti-Semitic policies. For 
instance, during the 1940 Soviet Occupation of Latvia, Jewish education was prohibited, 
Jewish people were forced to work on Shabbos (religious days of rest), and any indication of 
Zionism could result in deportation.317 Furthermore, Jewish citizens were disproportionally 
targeted by Soviet deportations. In Latvia, 20 percent of those deported in the 1940s were 
Jewish, even though Jews only made up 7.5 percent of the Latvian population. However, 
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there was a significant difference between the anti-Semitism of Stalin’s and Hitler’s regimes. 
The Soviet Union’s policies were generally assimilationist, whereas those of the Nazis were 
eliminationist. Stalin’s anti-Semitic intentions never reached the global scale of the Nazis’.318 
There was no Soviet equivalent of the Final Solution. By addressing Nazi anti-Semitism 
almost entirely in the context of Hitler’s ‘socialism’ and by drawing rhetorical parallels with 
the anti-Semitism of Stalin’s regime, the editors of Wikipedia distract attention from what 
was unique about the Nazis’ extermination of Jewish people. As Richard Evans points out: 
‘There was something peculiarly sadistic in the Nazis’ desire not just to torture, maim and kill 
the Jews, but also to humiliate them in public’.319 For the Nazis, Jewish people were not a 
regional obstacle to be removed, but a ‘world enemy’ who had to be eliminated from every 
corner of the earth. It was these intentions that marked out the Holocaust from other mass 
exterminations of the period, or indeed of any period. On the Wikipedia page these essential 
points are not acknowledged. The anti-Semitism of Nazism and Stalinism are implied to be 
equivalent. 
The totalitarian perspective presented on the ‘Comparisons of Nazism and Stalinism’ 
Wikipedia article was justified by some editors because of the existence of political initiatives 
like the Prague Declaration. For instance, in 2011, an individual who went by the username 
‘Spitfire3000’ argued that the article on Comparisons of Nazism and Stalinism did not 
present a ‘neutral point of view’. In a discussion about the contents of the article, 
Spitfire3000 stated that ‘the “equivalence” of Nazism and Stalinism is being pushed in a one-
sided way by this article’.320 The implied equivalence was achieved, he argued, by 
‘cherrypicked sources’ and ‘facts which are not fully explained to the uninitiated reader’.321 
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However, when Spitfire3000 attempted to institute a change in the article’s perspective he 
encountered opposition from another user. This individual, who went by the username 
‘Tataral’, disagreed with Spitfire3000’s assertion that the comparison of Nazism and 
Stalinism presented on the Wikipedia page was unbalanced. She argued that ‘the mainstream 
view is that both Stalinism and Nazism were totalitarian ideologies that were responsible for 
a large number of crimes against humanity’.322 She supported her claim by pointed to the 
existence of the Prague Declaration and the official EU support for 23 August as the 
European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and Stalinism. Tataral had clearly, 
therefore, been influenced by the narrative of Soviet-Nazi totalitarianism present in these 
declarations. In this instance, the attempt by MEPs from the CEECs to develop a narrative of 
World War II framed around totalitarian theory had entered public discourse. However, it is 
noteworthy that Tataral had to rely on political declarations in order to make her point, rather 
than the work of historians.   
Tataral’s inability directly to quote western historians to support her argument was 
demonstrative of the fact that the western narrative of World War II had not been changed at 
an academic level by the introduction of totalitarian theory into official EU memory 
discourse. In the west, the dominant academic perspective was that totalitarian theory is 
generally seen as having limited value as a tool of analytical comparison. Prominent western 
scholars, such as Sheila Fitzpatrick, Martin Broszat, and Hans Mommsen, demonstrated 
flaws in the totalitarian model during the 1970s and 1980s. These academics argued that 
totalitarian theory did not accurately describe the nuances of either the Stalinist or the Nazi 
regimes.323 For instance, Mommsen argued that the Nazi Party and the Communist Party 
were different in both organisational structure and in political function. To refer to both 
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simply as ‘totalitarian’ was therefore misleading.324 Totalitarian theory was further 
undermined during the Historikerstreit in the 1980s in West Germany. More recent 
scholarship on the regimes of Hitler and Stalin typically moved away from the totalitarian 
approach. This can be seen in Beyond Totalitarianism by Michael Geyer and Shelia 
Fitzpatrick and in The Dictators by Richard Overy.325 Furthermore, many western academics, 
including prominent World War II historian Richard Evans, continued to argue that Nazism 
was a unique phenomenon in history. The Holocaust, they note, was the only example to date 
of a deliberate policy aimed at the destruction of every member of an ethnic group and carried 
out through industrial means.326  
The fact that western scholarly literature continued to reject the assertion that Nazism 
and Stalinism were equivalent following the proclamation of 23 August represented a serious 
failure for MEPs looking to reframe official EU memory culture. The views of historians 
hold particular epistemic authority regarding memory culture and are central to any process 
of narrative negotiation. Indeed, one of the stated aims of the Prague Declaration was the 
establishment of ‘a European research institute for totalitarianism studies’. Research 
institutions based on the principles of totalitarian theory were established only in CEECs 
where the concept of totalitarianism was already central to the national narrative. In the west, 
by contrast, the totalitarian paradigm continued to be widely rejected at a scholarly level. 
Those western academics who did write history books that implied equivalence between the 
crimes of Hitler and Stalin found their work heavily criticised by their peers. For instance, 
Europe: A History by Norman Davies, The Devils’ Alliance: Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939 – 
1941 by Richard Moorhouse, and Bloodlands by Timothy Snyder, were deeply controversial 
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in western academic spheres. They were criticised by prominent academics such as Richard 
Evans, Omer Bartov, and Dovid Katz.327 Evans even stated that ‘Synder’s book is of no use. 
Instead, it forms part of a post-Cold War narrative that homogenises the history of mass 
murder by equating Hitler’s policies with those of Stalin.’328 The inability to bring western 
academics into line behind totalitarian theory would have serious consequences for the 
negotiation of an EU supra-national narrative.  
The fact that historians did not support the underlying memory framework present in 
the European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and Stalinism caused some 
difficulties for MEPs during their attempt to implement the day. Approximately half of the 
politicians who rejected the 2 April 2009 Resolution did so because they argued that the 
interpretation of history was the job of historians. During the explanation of votes in the 
European Parliament, MEPs would explain their abstention or rejection of the proposal on 
these grounds. This is best encapsulated by the words of Ioannis Varvitsiotis, Greek MEP of 
the liberal-conservative New Democracy Group, who stated that: 
 
we believe that majority decisions by Parliament are not competent to interpret 
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It was a position echoed by MEPs like Jens Holm and Eva-Britt Svensson of the 
European United Left-Nordic Green Left who were ‘deeply concerned about all direct or 
indirect efforts by politicians or parliaments trying to influence the general perception of 
historical events’.330 Similar arguments were presented by Maria Eleni Koppa of the 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement and others.331 Almost all of these politicians belonged to 
either Nordic, Western, or Southern European states.  
MEPs from CEECs did not draw on the works of historians in order to counter these 
arguments. This may have been because a discussion of academic perspectives on 
comparisons of Nazism and Stalinism would have revealed the ongoing opposition from 
some areas of western academia to totalitarian theory. Instead, these MEPs argued that 
parliament did have a role in creating history. Katrin Saks referred to it as a ‘moral 
obligation’ of politicians to take a stand on history, and thus she could not ‘support the 
approach that we should let historians decide what happened’.332 Estonian MEP Siiri Oviir 
also felt that parliament had an ‘obligation to prevent the recurrence of what we have 
discussed,’ and thus parliament had a role in maintaining ‘truth and memory’.333 While this 
approach successfully obfuscated the academic debates regarding the history of World War 
II, it also revealed divisions between eastern and western European approaches to history. It 
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did relatively little for the negotiation of a pan-European narrative which, as has already been 
stated, often relied on the support of historians as ‘expert witnesses’.334 
The attempt to create a pan-European supra-national narrative using the European 
Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and Stalinism encountered further obstacles 
when it failed to incorporate several noteworthy social and political groups. The majority of 
MEPs who explicitly rejected incorporating totalitarian theory into EU memory culture were 
members of communist political parties. During the 2 April 2009 explanation of votes, 
Athanasios Pafilis, MEP for the Communist Party of Greece, stated in hyperbolic fashion that 
‘no parliament, no parliamentary majority comprising the representatives and servants of the 
barbaric capitalist system can use slander, lies and forgery to wipe out the history of social 
revolution, written and signed by the people with their blood’.335 Pedro Guerreiro, of the 
Portuguese Communist Party, also opposed the establishment of 23 August, although he was 
slightly more restrained in his rhetoric. He pointed out that: 
 
this shameful resolution approved by Parliament is part of the operation to distort 
historical truth that is being undertaken by reactionaries and those seeking revenge... 
They are the same people who are rehabilitating in their own countries those who 
collaborated with the barbarism of the Nazis.336  
 
Coming from the mouths of avowed communists, these efforts to expose the motives 
of those who equate Nazism and Stalinism came across as somewhat disingenuous. 
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Furthermore, it provided ammunition for those who supported the resolution to tar those 
opposed as apologists for the Soviet Union. For instance, Flemish nationalist MEP, Frank 
Vanhecke, derided the fact that ‘very many left-wing politicians actively supported these 
Communist regimes, even though they play the holy innocent today, even in this 
Parliament’.337  
 However, more problematic than the objections of the communists was the opposition 
of Jewish groups, who felt the declaration minimised the experiences of Jewish people in the 
Holocaust. Jewish activists linked the Prague Declaration to growing anti-Semitic trends in 
the CEECs. Historian Efraim Zuroff repeatedly criticised the Prague Declaration,338 and the 
Simon Wiesenthal Centre accused some signatories of having ‘anti-Semitic, racist and 
Holocaust distortionist motives.’339 Academic, political, and Jewish criticisms culminated in 
2012 when academics Dovid Katz and Danny Ben-Moshe initiated the Seventy Years 
Declaration on 20 January, which was signed by 70 members of the European Parliament. 
Among other things, the Seventy Years Declaration rejected ‘attempts to obfuscate the 
Holocaust by diminishing its uniqueness and deeming it to be equal, similar or equivalent to 
Communism as suggested by the 2008 Prague Declaration.’340 The Seventy Years declaration 
was, at the time, criticised by Lithuania’s incumbent foreign minister Audronius Ažubalis, 
who stated ‘It is not possible to find a difference between Hitler and Stalin except in their 
moustaches’.341 These comments did little to bridge the memory cleavage between Jewish 
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groups and the dominant memory culture of CEECs regarding World War II. The position of 
many towards this new pan-European national narrative was summarized by historian and 
documentary maker Christopher Hale, who stated:  
 
The authors of the Prague Declaration grossly distort the historical record and seek 
ultimately to tear down the unique moral status of the Holocaust. The concept of 
‘double genocide’ lumps together heinous Soviet practices such as summary 
execution, deportation, imprisonment and loss of employment with the deliberate and 
planned attempt to liquidate an entire human group.342 
 
Finally, it would therefore be incorrect to assume that the narrative of Nazi-Soviet 
equivalence had become dominant in the official memory culture of western Europe 
following the declarations of 23 August as a commemorative day. For instance, while British 
and Germany MEPs signed the declaration on the proclamation of 23 August as European 
Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism, neither the German nor the 
British governments have ever marked the day with commemorations. Perhaps because of 
this, the day is practically unknown among the general population of these countries. On the 
other hand, both Germany and Britain still officially commemorate International Holocaust 
Memorial Day on 27 January.343 In the UK, financial support has been provided to the 
Holocaust Memorial Day Trust since 2005.344 Meanwhile, in 2015, the heir to the British 
throne, Prince Charles, stated that ‘the Holocaust is an unparalleled human tragedy and an act 
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of evil unique in history’.345 Similarly, during a visit to Israel’s national Holocaust memorial 
in 2018, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that the Shoah was an unprecedented 
crime against humanity.346 At an official level, liberal political elites in western Europe 
continue to support the assertion that the Holocaust was the central crime of the twentieth 
century. Whether these west political elites realise it or not, this continued belief in the 
uniqueness of the Holocaust is fundamentally incompatible with the totalitarian narrative 
being push by MEPs from CEECs. 
It seems that western European MEPs voted to pass 23 August out of ignorance 
regarding its challenge to the centrality of the Holocaust in EU memory culture. Dutch MEP 
Erik Meijer even stated that his party347 deemed the resolution on European Conscience and 
Totalitarianism to be ‘superfluous’.348 It is fair to say, therefore, that the European Day of 
Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and Stalinism has achieved limited success 
regarding the reconciliation of eastern and western European memory culture. It has initiated 
the establishment of some institutions of memory, but these are largely located in countries 
where the totalitarian narrative was already part of that country’s national narratives. 
Attempts to spread the supra-national narrative into official western European discourse have 
generally failed. Western European historians do not support totalitarian theory, and the 
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supra-national narrative continues to be criticised by key groups—most notably Jewish 
people.  
 
Why the failures? 
The attempts by MEPs in CEECs to renegotiate the broader European narrative of World War 
II was largely unsuccessful. These MEPs wanted to reconfigure the collective, pan-European 
narrative of World War II to make it more consistent with the national narratives that are 
being promoted in their own countries. However, by attempting to engage in a process of 
narrative negotiation without examining or modifying the national narratives of their own 
states, these MEPs doomed the process to failure.  
As Herbert Kelmen has pointed out, national narratives are limited to members of the 
nation and are therefore antithetical to the idea of negotiation. Kelman notes: 
 
At its core, national identity is clearly non-negotiable: indeed, the very idea of 
negotiating identity sounds like an oxymoron. National identity is a collective 
psychological conception, which cannot be dictated or prescribed by outsiders ... It 
[does not] make sense to tell them how to draw the boundaries of the group: whom to 
include and whom to exclude.349 
 
National narratives, therefore, are highly resistant to outside dictation. From a 
nationalist mindset, no one has the right to tell another nation how to teach its history or to 
pass moral judgement on their national heroes. The sovereign right for a ‘nation’ to teach its 
‘own’ history is therefore deeply ingrained in the psyche of nationalists. This is one of 
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reasons nationalists in the CEECs reacted poorly to the EU’s expectation that collaboration in 
the Holocaust be incorporated into official history.  
In some ways narrative negotiation poses an existential threat to national narratives. 
Narrative negotiation encourages people to examine many different narratives of the past 
without succumbing to ideas of separation or exclusion. Therefore, narrative negotiation 
presupposes a willingness on the part of actors to recognise that their version of the past may 
not be entirely accurate. Since identity is based on these narratives, negotiation requires of 
actors a willingness to rethink their own identities. As Homi Bhabha notes, alternate 
narratives are an existential threat to a country’s national narrative. National narratives 
construct stories of the past by selectively deploying events to create a consistent and 
continuous history of the nation. As these narratives are selective and rarely accurate, the text 
of the nation relies on unacknowledged sources or assumptions and represses issues, ideas or 
people who would call those assertions into question. Alternative narratives have the 
potential to introduce, as Bhabha says, ‘contradictions and alien supplements that can never 
be fully accommodated within the master narrative that seeks to construct a fully coherent 
nation.’350 Alternative narratives pose a danger to the narrative of the nation. They present 
these ‘alien supplements’ which call into question those unacknowledged sources or 
assumptions. The very fact that the process of narrative negotiation aims to transform 
national identity is deeply disturbing to nationalists. 
Therefore, when nationalist MEPs from CEECs sought to reconcile eastern and 
western memory culture regarding World War II, they did so in a way that would reinforce 
rather than question their national narratives. The process that led to 23 August was less 
about narrative negotiation than it was an attempt to seek recognition from western European 
politicians regarding the eastern nationalist interpretation of World War II. The difficulty for 
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MEPs from CEECs was that liberal political elites in western Europe remained committed to 
the centrality of the Holocaust in World War II. Many scholars and intellectuals continued 
argue that Holocaust was unique. In the words of Richard Evans:  
 
although the Nazi ‘Final Solution’ was one genocide among many, it had features that 
made it stand out from all the rest as well. Unlike all the others it was bounded neither 
by space nor by time. It was launched not against a local or regional obstacle but at a 
world-enemy seen as operating on a global scale. It was bound to an even larger plan 
of racial reordering and reconstruction involving further genocidal killing on an 
almost unimaginable scale, aimed, however, at clearing the way in a particular 
region—Eastern Europe—for a further struggle against the Jews and those the Nazis 
regarded as their puppets. It was set in motion by ideologues who saw world history 
in racial terms. It was, in part, carried out by industrial methods. These things all 
make it unique.351 
 
Despite an increasing move towards the far right among the general population in 
recent years, the recognition of the Holocaust has remained central to the narrative of western 
liberal political elites. For instance, in 2017, French President Emanuel Macron denounced 
attempts by French far-right leaders to gloss over French involvement in the deportation of 
Jewish people to Nazi death camps. The uniqueness of the Holocaust is at the centre of 
several key west European political ideals. Many people argue that the creation of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was inspired by Rene Cassin’s personal experience 
of losing Jewish relatives in the Holocaust and his involvement in Jewish organisations that 
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provided aid to Holocaust survivors.352 Similarly, in Germany, the Holocaust and its legacy 
has held a central place in the German national narrative since at least the Historikerstreit. In 
2015, Angela Merkel officially stated the Germany was responsible for the Holocaust and for 
the destruction it caused.353 The centrality of these events are not about to change any time 
soon. 
However, the government in the CEECs were unable to accept the unique position of 
the Holocaust due to the fact that it would weaken their own narratives of victimhood and 
would potentially tear down the mythical position of their national heroes. For instance, an 
honest engagement with the history of the Latvian Legion would undoubtedly raise awkward 
questions about the involvement of Legion personnel in the Holocaust prior to 1943. 
Accepting the position that the Holocaust was not just one of many genocides would 
demolish the core premise on which the historical narrative of Latvian nationalists is based: 
that the Soviets were just as bad as the Nazis. Many other nationalist narratives in the CEECs 
face the same problem. The narrative of heroic nationalists during World War II is a central 
part of the continuity of the national plot. To question that would weaken their national 
narrative. For this reason, the proponents of 23 August are more preoccupied with 
competitive victimhood than reconciliation. 
In his discussion of the Israel-Palestine conflict, Edward Said argued that, put in the 
hands of politicians, a mutual recognition of the other’s suffering was bound to fall in the 
realm of the tactical and the competitive. One tragedy would be measured against another for 
political gain. This would only lead to a competition over victimhood and narrative 
antagonism. Said was opposed to such a competition of victimhood. Speaking of the conflict 
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of victimhood created when Israelis and Palestinians compared the Holocaust to the Nakbah, 
Said stated: ‘Who would morally want to equate mass extermination with mass deportation? 
It would be foolish to even try. But they are connected—a different thing altogether—in the 
struggle of Palestine which has been so intransigent, its elements so irreconcilable.’354 Said’s 
message was that narratives of victimhood should be used to encourage empathy and 
understanding between two sides. ‘Understanding what happened to the Jews in Europe 
under the Nazis means understanding what is universal about human experience under 
calamitous conditions.’ However, the European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of 
Nazism and Stalinism falls much more heavily on the side of victimhood competition rather 
than reconciliation. By simultaneously placing the crimes of the Soviet Union on an equal 
footing with the Holocaust, while also rehabilitating Nazi collaborators, the day trivialises the 
experiences of Holocaust victims. This understandably contributed to the rejection of 23 
August by Jewish and western European activists.  
 It might well be possible for Europe to develop a pan-European supra-narrative, but 
not through the lens of the European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Nazism and 
Stalinism. This day was constructed to defend the national narratives of states in east and 
central Europe, and it is fundamentally divisive. This is partly a reflection of the oppositional 










This thesis has ranged across three countries and explored several themes relating to 
nationalism, yet its focus has generally been on the impact of narratives and of narrative 
communities on expressions of national identity. This is because, as Anderson, Bell, Bhabha, 
and White have suggested, narrative lies at the core of nationalism as a political force. It is 
therefore necessary to explore narrative in order to answer the question set out in the 
introduction: can nationalism be divorced from the language of exclusion and ethnic divisions 
and be used instead to defend concepts of individual civil liberties, inclusivity, and 
democracy? This thesis suggests that, while perhaps not impossible, any attempt to deploy 
nationalism in an inclusive, liberal way is extremely difficult in practice owing to the 
conflicts that arise between divergent stories of the nation. There are three levels of narrative 
conflict explored in this thesis.  
The first level of narrative competition, as explored in Chapter 2, involve the tensions 
that occur when personal, individual stories conflict with the official, governing narrative of 
the state. In exploring this tension, we necessarily have to the complex interactions between 
memory and national narrative. As Duncan Bell’s concept of ‘mythscapes’ suggests, these 
personal memories have the potential to bring to light historical events which the governing 
narrative would prefer remained in the dark. National narratives, therefore, are engaged in a 
constant tug of war with the memories of the members who comprise the nation. On the one 
hand, personal memory must be nested within a national narrative in order for that national 
narrative to have emotional resonance. On the other hand, the national narrative typically 
seeks to homogenise personal memory in order to present a particular experience as common 
to all members of the national memory community. In Russia, this can be seen in the 
activities of the Immortal Regiment, which often incorporates the memorialisation of women, 
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workers, prisoners-of-war, and victims of Soviet cruelty or incompetence, alongside the 
traditional masculine, military heroes of the Russian war effort.  
The tensions between the personalised Immortal Regiment and the homogenising Red 
Square Parade has caused the Russian government to attempt to incorporate the Immortal 
Regiment into official commemorations. The direct memorialisation of individual stories is 
one way in which states may attempt to resolve the narrative conflict between personal 
memory and official national narrative. Yet the incorporation of diverse personal experiences 
does not solve the underlying issue in this situation, which is that personal memory 
undermines and destabilises the assumptions, stereotypes, and limited focus, which forms the 
foundation on which the national narrative is built. The Russian government’s solution to this 
issue has been to attempt to co-opt the energy of the Immortal Regiment and the personal 
stories that it represents, whilst also presented it within a larger homogenising national 
narrative. This process has occurred alongside attempts to remove the more subversive 
elements of the march. It is debatable whether the Russian state’s attempt to subsume the 
Immortal Regiment in the governing narrative has been entirely successful. What is beyond 
question is that Putin’s attempt to homogenise memory is fundamentally illiberal. A liberal 
society ought to respect individual narratives, which raise awkward questions for liberal 
nationalist when those individual narrative come into conflict with the governing narrative. 
The second level of narrative competition, as explored in Chapter 3, is the tendency 
for conflict to arise when separate interpretive communities within a nation interpret the past 
in incompatible ways. Hayden White demonstrated to us that the past is written in the form of 
an historical narrative. If we combine this theory with Stanley Fish’s work on interpretive 
communities, it is logical to assume that groups of individuals who use similar methods of 
historical narrative interpretation will form historical interpretive communities.  The 
individuals who comprise these interpretive communities will have come to the same 
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conclusions about the value and meaning of the national story and will regard alternative 
interpretations of the past as being historically inaccurate. In Australia, the conflict between 
interpretive communities can be observed on Anzac Day, when different communities debate 
what is performatively appropriate to say or to do during official commemorations. The 
debates stem from different understandings of the meaning of Australian nationalism. 
Attempts to reconcile these perspectives ultimately fail because it is impossible to resolve the 
differences that exist between the underlying narratives which form the heart of the different 
interpretive communities. The result is that attempts to express national identity in a personal 
way become entwined with intergroup conflict over the national story. Under these 
conditions, national days become sites of interpretive contestation rather than of national 
unity. Attempting to incorporate divergent interpretive communities into a narrative of unity 
simply reveals the extent to which a society is disunited.  
The third level of narrative competition, as explored in Chapter 4, involves the 
competition of rival narratives at the level of international relations. Of the various forms of 
narrative conflict discussed in this thesis, competition between incompatible national 
narratives is a topic that is well covered in the wider scholarly literature. As Homi Bhabha 
suggests, narrative conflict is a central element in all national narratives. They simultaneously 
rely on the existence of nations outside their borders while also feeling threatened by the 
alternative interpretations of history presented in those nations’ own national narratives. 
Crucially, these narrative conflicts occur even been nations bound together in mutually 
supportive supra-national organisations, such as the European Union. The ongoing debates in 
the EU regarding the history, nature, impact, and comparison of Soviet and Nazi crimes is 
demonstrative of these narrative tensions. Here the divergent narratives regarding the history 
of the twentieth century succeed only in highlighting the continuing tensions that exist 
between the states of eastern and western Europe.  
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 Attempts to resolve these memory conflicts through a process of narrative negotiation 
ultimately failed when forced to accommodate nationalist pride. Indeed, the process of 
narrative negotiation in the European Union was initiated in order to defend the dominant 
narrative mythscapes of some eastern European states. The governing narratives in many 
eastern European countries idealise Nazi collaborators and so attempted to rewrite the history 
of Europe in order to reframe them as Soviet resisters. But when narrative negotiation is 
undertaken with this nationalist mindset, it leaves very little room for the necessary degree of 
compromise. The nationalist rejection of external dictation with regard to memory severely 
limits the potential for the national story to be shaped within a process of narrative 
negotiation. Further problems arise when historians are rejected as arbiters in the narrative 
negotiation process because their findings shed light on nationalist assumptions and 
mistruths. Both elements, however, are a component of a deeper problem at the heart of 
nationalist narrative negotiation. The process of narrative negotiation can only achieve be 
successful when the commonalities of human experience are acknowledged. Such an 
acknowledgement implicitly threatens the very foundation of national identity. 
 Thus, nationalist thinking and nationalist narratives cause conflict while also standing 
in the way of potential solutions. Nationalists seek to develop stories of national unity which 
homogenise both the individuals within the nation and the distinct communities within the 
nation. Yet they also claim that their national experience is unique, for without its uniqueness 
the nation can no longer be said to exist. In this context, it is hard to support Liah Greenfeld’s 
claim that there can be a liberal and inclusive nationalism. Perhaps, therefore, it is time we 
stopped trying to reform nationalism and looked instead to trying to create a narrative which 
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